Monty Ramberg's

Does Libertarianism Support Open Borders?

2009-09-10T18:03:00.000-07:00

Thought I'd post some more essays from the past year. Here's one from a class in International Justice:

I. Introduction
In this essay I wish to investigate whether libertarianism can offer a coherent and convincing argument for open borders. I have for long found libertarianism to be a compelling idea, perhaps especially for what I perceived to be its principled positive approach towards free movement. I was therefore surprised to find that several authors have professed doubt in whether it really would support the free movement of individuals. This essay is not primarily concerned with the debate between libertarian and other theories who profess, or include amongst their supporters people who profess, a dedication to open borders. It is rather an attempt to understand whether a libertarian argument for open borders can make any sense.
The following is divided into two parts. In part two I first of all present Joseph Carens’ argument for why libertarianism supports open borders. I then move on to consider two separate counterarguments; those of Michael Walzer and Joseph Seglow. Relating this critique to a distinction between what John Rawls would call ideal and non-ideal theory, I then go on to explain why I think that these critiques do not manage to show that libertarianism does not support open borders. In part three I summarize my conclusions, and raise points of further interest which have struck me whilst writing, but which I have not been able to fit in to the discussion.
II. A Libertarian Argument for Open Borders
Joseph Carens enlists the help of Robert Nozick to point out that theories which place an emphasis on property rights cannot be successfully used to argue for border controls. This is due to a number of factors, most notably that libertarianism does not grant the state any right to interfere in contractual understandings between individuals (Carens, 1987, 332f). Furthermore, since libertarianism is concerned with individual property rights, it could not be used to argue for the protection of the state’s resources if these were to be understood as collective property, nor could it be used to argue for the protection of a specific group, since the state would then show an unjust preference for some over others (Ibid). However, even though Carens believes that the libertarian position does imply that states do not have a moral right to exclude immigrants, he does not think that the problem of exclusion as such would be avoided by the argument. The reason for this would be the significant power available to property holders to exclude others from their land, a power which they would have over citizens and non-citizens alike (Ibid, 333). Yet, even granted this possibility of exclusion, Carens still holds that libertarianism supports open borders. The exclusion which would be done by private property holders would be fundamentally different from that of the state’s illegitimate exclusion, since the latter is based on an idea of collective property (Ibid).
Jonathan Seglow questions Carens’ assertion and points to an argument forwarded by Hillel Steiner. (Seglow, 2005, 324). Steiner holds that libertarianism does not preclude the possibility of communities seceding from existing states and forming new political associations. These would have every right to exclude outsiders, granted that the territory upon which they reside is privately owned by the members of the association (Ibid). Seglow holds that these communities could be understood as states, and therefore concludes that “[l]ibertarianism hardly supports open borders” (Ibid). Seglow’s critique echoes concerns raised by Michael Walzer, who in his Spheres of Justice contends that a state which models its border controls on that of a neighbourhood association, i.e. with no legal right to exclude outsiders, will inevitably crumble and give way to smaller communities, with the result being not a borderless world, but rather a world with a near infinite amount of borders (Walzer, 1985, 38).
Do these observations damage Carens’, and in extension, Nozick’s arguments enough for us to conclude that libertarianism in fact does not support open borders? I would argue that they do not. In order to show why I think this is the case we first need to look at how Carens handles Walzer’s assertions about states as neighbourhoods.
In a direct response to Walzer, Carens questions the analogy of states as neighbourhoods and argues that open states could more correctly be understood as analogous to cities or provinces within a system like that in USA. Since freedom of movement overrides other claims within states, Carens sees no reason for why this freedom should not be extended across the borders of nation-states (Carens, 1987, 343). In another article, Carens also contests the idea that open borders would undermine the sovereignty of the state. He points to the example of the European Union, where a system of open borders has been established without the constituent states collapsing or even losing out significantly in terms of sovereignty (Carens, 1999, 1089). An apparent counterargument to this observation would be that the examples of cities, provinces and federations are still based on an idea which presumes an overarching authority with significant control over border admissions. The European Union, with its free internal mobility, still controls its borders and excludes thousands of people from entering every year. However, for someone who is concerned primarily with the moral argument for freedom of movement this critique could be easily countered; there is no reason to why a similar system like that of the European Union could not be extended to include all the states of the world. Libertarians would most likely find this to be a better solution than the current system of nation-states, granted that the new world-wide authority would be limited in its scope to enforcing the fundamental rights of individuals. Although there are a number of arguments which could be raised against this idea, and in favour of Walzer’s argument, these would tend to be connected to values and empirical issues which are not of direct interest in this setting, as we are mainly concerned here with the internal logic of the libertarian argument.
Seglow’s critique is more troubling and of a greater interest to the issue at hand, because whereas Walzer’s critique is based on the implications of the libertarian argument in the current world, Seglow points to a potential internal problem when the libertarian argument is taken to its full extension. As already mentioned above, Seglow’s assertion concerning the possibility of new states arising with theoretical rights of exclusion is based on an argument by Hillel Steiner. Although Steiner holds, in line with Carens, that in a world such as our own with disputed or morally imperfect property rights libertarians would not be able to argue for immigration restrictions, the case would be different, at least in outcome, if we would consider a perfect libertarian world (Steiner, 1992, 90). Here we are moving into what Rawls would call “ideal theory”. In such a situation all the other relevant libertarian preconditions would have been met; the appropriation of land and resources would have been carried out in a just fashion and all states would derive their property claims and grounds for existence from the collected properties and contractual obligations of its constituent members. Secession and exclusion would here be a distinct possibility, since the reason for keeping outsiders out would be derived from property claims (Steiner, 1992, 92f).
Prima facie, this seems to be quite damning for the prospect of open borders. However, I would like to argue that this argument holds less power than what one might at first think. Keep in mind that we are discussing a situation where the starting point would already be dramatically different from the world which we inhabit. Most likely, most states that exist in this current world would not exist under such conditions, nor is it likely that the distribution of resources would closely resemble that of our world. Seglow expresses concern that the right for communities to secede and form closed states would be rife in such a world. Yet, I would argue that Seglow’s image of the ideal libertarian situation is unjustifiably bleak. In such a setting it would be largely irrelevant to talk of the ideas of states or transnational immigration as we understand it in our current setting. Morally justified exclusion would only be possible if the community which was wishing to exclude others did so with the expressed consent of all of it constituent members. It is true that associations could choose to exclude outsiders, but it is just as likely, or perhaps more so, that they would choose not to. In any sense, I would argue that the claim that libertarianism does not support open borders is close to incoherent if we are arguing on the level of ideal theory, since the notions of states and borders would no longer be of primary interest, and political associations at least possibly would be much more fluid and prone to change in territorial respects.
III. Conclusions
I have found that libertarianism can offer a coherent argument for open borders. In the context of our current world order, which from a libertarian viewpoint is a less than an ideal situation, the argument would rest on the equal moral worth of each individual and the right to freedom of association and contract. Since the only powers ideally available to the state in libertarian theory are those of enforcing individual rights, and since the theory does not assign any fundamental value to claims which go beyond these rights, libertarians would most likely be in favour of a world-state with limited powers over a system of states as is currently the case.
Although there is a distinct possibility that in an ideal libertarian world closed communities could arise which would have a moral right to exclude outsiders, I do not believe that this assertion is reason enough to question the libertarian commitment to open borders. This is due to the fluidity of the outer demarcations of these communities which could change as soon as a member would choose to leave the community, join another or perhaps start their own.
There remains a point which I have not gone into in this essay, but that is worth mentioning. This is connected to the idea of the freedom to choose, start or leave political associations in the ideal libertarian situation. Since there is no form or size of association which can be considered to be ideal, the possibility could arise of political associations consisting of anything from a single individual to every person in the world. Without an overarching structure, i.e. a state or a world state to handle possible conflicts arising between these associations on contractual issues it is hard to see how these conflicts could be solved. I believe the problems connected to secession and the lack of a global mediator are not restricted to the libertarian idea, yet it does put these problems into focus. However, this is a question which is far too complex to look deeper into in this paper.

Bibliography

Carens, J.H. (1987) ‘Aliens and Citizens, the Case for Open Borders’. Review of Politics, vol. 49, 2, 251-273.

_________. (1999) ‘A Reply to Meilaender: Reconsidering Open Borders’. International Migration Review, vol. 33, 4, 1082-1097)

Seglow, J. (2005) ‘The Ethics of Immigration’. Political Studies Review, vol. 3, 3, 317-334.

Steiner, H. (1992) ‘Libertarianism and the Transnational Migration of People’. In Barry, B. & Goodin, R.E. (1992) Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Walzer, M. (1985) Spheres of Justice: a Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell.

Rawls and Disability

2008-12-08T06:58:00.000-08:00

All right, below is the first essay that I have handed in at UCL, for the class Contemporary Political Philosophy II with Jonathan Wolff. Grade received was surprisingly good, so I am quite happy. Feel free to comment if you have feel it is not too boring to read through.

For the purpose of his argument Rawls assumes that everyone in society is able-bodied. What complications arise when we accept that some are handicapped? Can Rawls approach be extended to deal with such cases?

I. Introduction
As pointed out by Will Kymlicka, John Rawls tries in A Theory of Justice to develop an alternative view to the prevailing view of equality of opportunity. Although positive to the general direction of Rawls’ argument, Kymlicka believes that it does not do enough to address inequalities based on differences in natural ability, and proposes an extension of Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity argument to compensate for natural inequalities on the same basis as social inequalities. I shall argue in this paper that although there is some weight to Kymlicka’s argument, I believe it rests on an oversimplification of Rawls’ ideas. In addition, I will introduce the “social model” argument, which states that the concept of disability is a social construct. I believe that there is a possibility that Rawls’ argument concerning disability can be strengthened by a partial accommodation of the social model argument.
The rest of the essay is divided into three parts. In section II I will outline and asses Kymlicka’s critique. In section III I will introduce the social model approach and present the consequences this might have for Rawls’ argument. For the purpose of the discussion, I will in the first part of the essay consistently use the word disability in its broad meaning, encompassing other terms such as handicap and impairment. However, as already hinted, section III includes a discussion about an existing conceptual dispute, which will lead me to question this use.

II. Defending Rawls on his own terms
In Contemporary Political Philosophy Will Kymlicka offers a critique of John Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism as defined in A Theory of Justice and other works. Of particular interest for the topic of this essay is Kymlicka’s focus on what he views as Rawls’ inconsistent use of primary goods and the problems entailed with this approach when one considers natural inequalities. In the context of his social contract argument Rawls introduces the concept of primary goods; “(…) things that every rational man is presumed to want (…) that have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls, 1999, 54). Rawls further distinguishes between social and natural goods. Liberties, rights, opportunities, income and wealth and the social bases of self-respect are social goods; these are under control of society. Natural goods such as health, vigor, intelligence and imagination are not controlled by - but are influenced by - societal structures (Ibid, Kymlicka 2002, 64-65). Rawls argues that in the original position, the participants will strive to establish a society where the social primary goods are most easily accessed by all, and where no one is unfairly benefited by virtue of their natural primary goods (Kymlicka, 2002, 70). In other words, any benefit in terms of social goods which individuals receive due to their talent or intelligence etc. must be weighed up by an equal or greater benefit to those who are the least well-of in terms of social goods. This view is one that Kymlicka shares. However, he recognizes that there remains a problem. The prevailing view is that Rawls does not factor in natural disadvantages as grounds for compensation. This has the effect that a person who is for instance severely disabled can be seen to be just as well of as a healthy person who has the same amount of primary social goods, and indeed better off than a much healthier person who has marginally less (Ibid.). As Kymlicka points out, this does not seem fair when we consider that ill health is likely to mean that unhealthy people will incur costs which healthy people do not, thus leaving them with less disposable income, and most likely lesser quality of life (Ibid, 70ff). If we consider that a handicap or disease is likely to have an effect on one’s general quality of life already in itself, this seems even less fair. Kymlicka’s solution to this perceived flaw in Rawls’ theory is rather simple. He proposes that it should be restated so that natural inequalities will be made into grounds for compensation just like social inequalities (Ibid, 72). However, he hints that the problems arising upon application might be quite significant, and that this could be the reason for Rawls’ avoidance of this type of solution (Ibid, 77).
Is Kymlicka’s critique fair? Yes and no. I believe that a broader reading of Rawls gives us reason to argue that Kymlicka’s critique in some senses is misguided. John Rawls did not completely overlook the question of disability and other natural inequalities. As Kymlicka rightly points out, in TJ Rawls discusses, and eventually rejects, a principle of redress (Ibid, 98). This is in Rawls own words defined as: “(…) the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowments are uncalled for, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for” (Rawls, 1999, 86). Prima facie, this looks a lot like Kymlicka’s proposed solution. However, Kymlicka argues that Rawls is right in rejecting the principle, as compensation should not be given primarily to level comparative advantages in ability, but in order to give the disabled “(…) the same ability to lead a satisfying life” (Kymlicka 2002, 99). Kymlicka’s reasoning here seems a little confused. Even though Rawls rejects the principle of redress he claims that the difference principle in many instances acts towards the same goal. In the example of education he argues that resources should be focused to better the situation for the least advantaged students. Furthermore, he claims that education should not be focused solely on producing efficient, productive citizens, but that a wider approach is necessary in order to provide for a development of self-esteem (Rawls, 1999, 87). In other words, the natural inequality of - for instance - learning difficulties is to be compensated for in terms of a directed distribution of social goods towards the least advantaged, not only for them to become as productive as others, but to provide the grounds for a fuller life. Furthermore, if we argue that disability s likely to have an effect on a person’s ability to learn and develop, not only directly, but also indirectly, by for instance being disadvantaged in terms of access to school buildings and other resources, Kymlicka’s and Rawls’ arguments seem identical. I believe that Rawls’ proposal for aimed redistributive measures is open for such an interpretation. It is thus unclear how Rawls view is different from the solution proposed by Kymlicka, at least when applied to the example of education.
As the observant reader might now object, the above discussion presupposes that Rawls’ takes into account disability, i.e. that he does not base his theory on a premise that everyone is able-bodied. I believe that there is reason to question whether or not this is entirely true. In an essay written after the publication of TJ Rawls states the following;

It is best to make an initial concession in the case of special health and medical needs. I put this difficult problem aside in his paper and assume that all citizens have physical and psychological capacities within a certain normal range. I do this because the first problem of justice concerns the relations between citizens who are normally active and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life (Sen & Williams, 1982, 168).

Now, a broad definition of disability encompasses a wide range of imparities, including not only severe mental and physical handicaps but also temporary or less severe conditions. Consider for example an amputee; missing a foot, hand or arm. Although this condition is one that I believe most people would classify as a disability, with the added problems in everyday life arising from such a condition, it is hard to see how it would render the person unable to be a “fully cooperating and active member of society”. It can of course be argued that a person’s disability is likely to have a different impact depending on what supportive structures are already in place; being an amputee in Liberia or Tibet can be assumed to be quite a different affair than being one in Japan or Great Britain. However, due to the openness and ambiguity inherent in the above statement I see no difficulty in applying a contemporary, empirically based view which can have the effect of including a great number of disabilities in the “normal range”. It would, quite rightly, be viewed as almost grotesque to argue that a wheel-chair borne accountant or a blind radio DJ would not be able to take part in a majority of societal affairs. Hence I conclude that the assertion that Rawls theory excludes everyone who is not able-bodied is one which can be questioned. There are of course some troubling exceptions left which gives weight to the view I am questioning, the most glaring such the issue of severe mental conditions. However, this does not fully refute my argument.
Let us focus again on Kymlicka’s critique. Can we argue that Kymlicka’s and Rawls’ arguments converge in other areas than education? As we have seen, the basis of Kymlicka’s argument lies in a questioning of what he sees as an arbitrary distinction made by Rawls between inequalities in natural and primary goods where the former is not grounds for compensation while the latter is (Kymlicka, 2002, 98). This leads Kymlicka to question why people discriminated against on basis of their social class or ethnic belonging are entitled to compensation when disabled persons are not (Ibid, 72). I believe this question to be misleading based on two reasons. Firstly, in Justice as Fairness – a Restatement Rawls states that on a basic interpretation of the difference principle the least advantaged are to be viewed as such simply based on their relative income and wealth. Claims for compensation based on gender or race are not to be valued independently of the claimant’s relative standing in terms of money, given that basic equal rights and liberties have already been assigned appropriately (Rawls, 2001, 59). Secondly, on a fuller understanding of the difference principle, where the social good of self-respect is central, I argue that Rawls can be understood to argue for compensation on grounds of gender and race as well as on grounds of disability, at least if we take compensation to mean indirect measures as opposed to cash handouts. Rawls stresses the importance of self-respect, defined as a sense of one’s own value and a confidence in one’s own ability, to be of such importance that “(…) the parties in the original position would wish at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine [it]” (Rawls, 1999, 386). If we assume that social conditions are such, that individuals are undervalued based on their disability, race or gender, not in terms of formal equal liberties and rights but in their general role as society members, it believe it safe to assume that their self-respect would be suffering and that a society based on Rawlsian principles would seek to do something about the situation.
In order to avoid the claim that I have made a straw-man out of Kymlicka’s argument, I will admit that the assertions I have forwarded in this section rest on a rather open reading of Rawls. As such, it might be argued that I have done little to show that Kymlicka is wrong in his critique. However, I do believe that there is reason to believe that a Rawlsian approach would be more attentive to the needs of persons with disabilities than has been suggested. This brings us on to our final section, where I will look at an alternative view of disability and the consequences this entails for our discussion.

III. The Social Model and Justice as Fairness
In order to draw attention to the issue of disability as a subject of political theory, which he believed to be one that traditionally has not been granted a prominent enough status, Peter Handley wrote an article on the social model of disability in 2003, in which he presents its main characteristics and sketches out some possible consequences for established political theory (Handley, 2003, 109f).
According to Handley, both Rawls and Kymlicka, and indeed a majority of political theorists, hold what he calls a “common-sense view of disability” (Ibid). This is the view that disability is in essence a medical issue, whereby it “(…) amounts to the reduction or absence of an individual’s physical, cognitive or sensory functions to the point that ‘normal’ functioning and capabilities are restricted or absent and that such states are entirely natural phenomena” (Ibid, 110). Contrasting this view, then, is the social model. This argument turns, much like feminist approaches, the argument around and holds that disability is a social construct. Whereas individuals can be impaired in one way or other, it is only in a social setting they are made disabled, as society is built on a norm of “fully functioning” or “able-bodied” individuals (Ibid, 111f). As Handley points out, it is fair to question whether such a norm is not false, considering that most people will at some point in their life be impaired in one way or another (Ibid, 115). At first sight, the social model seems to be quite damning for Rawls’ argument. However, as Handley points out, a complete acceptance of the social model and the resulting radical policy transformations is not needed, maybe even not beneficial, in order to effectively tackle the issue of disability. Handley thus proposes a middle ground view, where the social model can be used to identify areas where political action is needed, whilst retaining at least a partial acceptance of the medical view in order to alleviate some impairments (Ibid 113ff). Given the possibilities inherent in Rawls’ theories that I have outlined above, namely in his focusing on the social good of self-respect and the rather fluent concept of a “normal range” of capabilities, I believe that there is reason to believe that at least a partial combination of justice as fairness and a revised social model can bring Rawls ideas to form the basis for a much more extensive egalitarian approach than has been previously thought, even by Rawls himself. This is however, a question which would need to be studied closer and as such it is beyond the scope of this essay.

Bibliography

Handley, P. (2003) Theorising Disability: Beyond Common Sense. Politics, 23, 2, 109-118.

Kymlicka, W. (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

______. (2001) Justice as Fairness – A Restatement. Cambridge, Massachusetts; The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Sen, A.K. & Williams, B. (eds.) (1982) Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Re - Evaluation pt 1

2008-10-12T16:59:00.000-07:00

Bam! Course work hit me like a shovel.

Back in academia-land. I tell you, it does feel a bit odd, yet strangely comforting to be there, head in book, and this time in yet another country. I am currently reading John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, Rawls' A Theory of Justice and some legal theory signed Hart and Dworkin.

As the title above suggests, I have also started to think quite a lot about my political views. I have decided to try and reset my compass and approach the readings assigned to me with an open mind. I have, as of now, no clue where I will end up on the spectrum after I come out on the other side of this. For now, all I want to do is learn as much as I possibly can. And, to judge from the the way the schedule looks and from the level that my class mates are on, it looks more than likely that I will get quite a lot of value for my money.

My Thesis is Done!

2007-05-10T21:10:00.000-07:00

Ok, so I have finally handed in my thesis. It has its weak sides, but over all I am pretty happy with the result. If you are interested in Hurricane Katrina, read it here:
www.willamette.edu/~mramberg

Response Paper 8

2006-12-08T14:35:00.001-08:00

Response Paper- Andre Gorz
One of the most pressing issues in the Swedish political debate of now is what to do about long-term unemployment in its different forms. The argument on the Right many times takes the form of a critique of the welfare state and its supposed suppression of the work morality. The welfare system, in this line of argument, offers too easy a solution for individuals not interested in work, who will end up taking advantage of the system. The solution to the problem is, according to these people, less emphasis on social security and more so on economic growth and flexible labor market laws. Thereby jobs would be created and the unemployed taken care of. The problem with the welfare state would then be that it has not efficiently enough enforced a work moral. Hence the Right many times bring up old socialist slogans such as “the right to work” against the socialist project of the welfare state. In this context, it is interesting to consider Grosz’ critique of the “socialist morality”. Although the socialist morality in his argument is mentioned in a slightly different context, one cannot argue other than that the welfare system is built on grounds of a moral obligation to work and contribute. The welfare state therefore, in Grosz’ argument, would be a system perpetuating totalitarian ideals. The link to libertarian ideals in this context is very interesting.
In essence, Grosz’ shares a number of ideals with modern libertarians, but they are divided over a very basic issue; whether or not wage labor can constitute freedom. According to Grosz, there will always be a great number of people who do not find any other function of wage labor than to earn money in order to “live”. One can of course not argue with this fact, but I find it more interesting to focus on another fact: that there are a lot of people who manage to find a job where they actually get a sense of satisfaction. I would also argue that the number of people who find their work stimulating has increased over time, and not the other way round. When we look at Grosz’ second text, about ecology, we get an image of what a step on the way to his utopian society would look like. It becomes evident when reading this part that his argument is not fully consistent. People might just work 20 hours per week, but where and how is his work performed? There must still be an element of repression, since one cannot freely choose where or with what to work. Let’s say that one would not like to work at all, how would society answer to this? Where in the capitalist system a person at least has the theoretical ability to move towards even more satisfying work, in Grosz’ society this ability is not available in the line of socialized work. One must also wonder, wherein lies the need to dedicate time to pottery etc. in times when these are not needed for anything else than decorative purposes? I would argue that the reason to why these things used to have a direct use-value is because they were needed. Is there really a higher inherent value in a cabinet because it has been made, and not bought, by me? It feels like Grosz in this second text provides an argument which seems more colored by an old fashioned, romantic, idea of what “value” really means.

Response Paper 7

2006-12-08T14:35:00.000-08:00

Response Paper
What is wrong with Russia? Reading the chapter on the revolutions of 1989 in Eley made me think of the fact that Russia has been significantly behind in the economic and social development that has dramatically transformed large parts of central and eastern Europe. Although, as Eley points out, Russia under Jeltsin went through much of the same “shock treatment” as the rest of the countries in the eastern bloc, it did not manage to develop at the same rate as the other counties once the dust settled.
Though I might largely be speculating I can think of a number of possible reasons. Eley argues that the EU governments had no interest in democracy per se for eastern Europe, but were just looking for access to the new markets. I think this is a rather bold statement, and I do not think it holds up in the longer time frame. As the central and eastern European countries started to show interest in joining the European community they were forced indirectly to reform in order to take part in negotiations. Hence the European Union played an important part as outside proponent of democratization. Because of the sheer size of the Russian republic and its traditional role in the European political life, it has never been thought of as a truly potential member of the European Union. Hence the same pressure has not been applied by the European states.
The difference in political culture is often pointed out as being fundamental to the failure of Russian democracy. A number of the central European states that have gone through a rapid democratic evolvement have at least during a short time of their history been a constitutional democracy of some sort. The lack of a democratic tradition in Russia can be assumed to be of importance.
The fact that Russia for the most part of the last ten years or so has been involved in a bloody conflict in Chechnya has certainly not helped the democratic efforts. During a war an administration is a lot more likely to be lax with questions concerning human rights etc. With a significant part of the administrative power gathered directly under the executive as in Russia, the possibilities for corruption are next to endless. All in all, these conditions are not exactly conducive to democratic and economic development.

Response Paper 6

2006-12-08T14:34:00.000-08:00

Response Paper- Gramsci
What made me once turn away from socialism was that I found it to be, contrary to what its proponents would say, an elitist movement. The most engaged “socialists” I would meet as a teenager were often from an upper-middle class background. These were the people that my friend Henrik, electrician and union activist, would refer to as the “red-wine left”. We knew very well that as soon as these people would come out on the labor market and start owning higher wages, they would slowly move away from their adolescent dreams and start voting for the liberal party or the conservatives. They would still think back on those days with a warm feeling, probably greatly overestimating their level of involvement or impact. Henrik and I shared that feeling. For him it would turn into bitterness, but also increased radicalization and engagement in the workers movement. After much deliberation, I chose a path more natural for a university student of political science, one in which I felt that I could argument with the intellectual left without being reactionary. That path was libertarianism.
The reading of Gramsci’s Marxism and Modern Culture brought these thoughts back to my mind. In my understanding, this exact conflict is what is at the heart of Gramsci’s arguments. While lead and discussed by intellectuals from the middle classes, Marxism is not a workers movement, hardly even a movement for the workers. Without an intellectualization of the working classes on their own terms, Marxism is doomed to be an elitist movement.
What many view as radical politics today (fair trade, sustainability etc.) rely on middle-class action for the working class. As long as this is the case, the class rifts will remain deep, with the workers held at a safe distance in order to receive the crumbs. I am not sure what Gramsci’s solution to this problem entails. My solution is the democratization of information and international trade that we are currently experiencing. A solution brought on by profit interests, combined with the audacity and ingenuity of individuals all over the world.

Response Paper 5

2006-11-19T23:19:00.000-08:00

I found Serings piece on fascism to be highly interesting. The definitions and expressions used in his piece are worthy of a closer investigation, if one wants to ground his work in the current time. Although he does not define the exact meaning of planned capitalism, it is fairly clear that what he is aiming at is corporatism. A system- which he points out- that can be the tool for both imperialism or progressive planning for welfare. At least the initial states of fascism would thus rest on the same model as the welfare state as it has come to be developed in a lot of European countries, only with the exception that labor has been left out of the game. Fascism is, furthermore, a “product of decomposition”, a result of the democratic crisis in times of economic hardship.
I think proponents of both socialism and classic liberalism can find Serings piece as speaking for their solutions. The liberals would hold out the corruptibility of the political system and the moulding of political and economic spheres as the weak point, whereas socialists would look to the cycles of crises in the capitalist system. The liberals could argue that the crises have had the severe effect that they have been seen to have had because of the close interconnectedness of state and economy. His distinctions between planned and unplanned capitalism and planned and unplanned imperialism, leaves the field open for arguments following the similar line. It is therefore a forceful argument against capitalism in the real world, without getting stuck in the theoretical jargon that he knows is hard to argue with. That the solution, to Sering, lies outside of the system and not in it becomes clear though, as he points out that there are indeed two worlds, and that the wanderer between these two worlds has nothing to offer. Therefore we have reason to believe that Sering is a proponent of a solution far more radical than that of the social democrats.

ABOUT THE MOVEMENT

2006-11-19T11:12:00.000-08:00

During this, my third semester at Willamette University, I have learned more about USA than I could ever have hoped for. I have started to discover the country behind the statistics and the school book examples through its most important element: its people. This discovery is still only at the very basic level, and I do not hold any illusions that I will ever gain a full understanding. The Willamette University campus is an extremely small and skewed representation of this country. Through the education and personal interactions I have been personally blessed with here through my work as well as through my other social interactions though, I have come to learn a great deal about this country, my home country and most importantly about myself.

Yesterday I was amazed by the response from the university administration to the demands brought forward by the Concerned Students for Social Justice. I have never before seen an action taken by a number of students have such instant and profound effect. I feel honored to be a part of something that I hope will profoundly change not only this, but other campuses. I will do my best to bring word about what is going on at our campus to everyone I know, wherever they may be, so that they might feel inspired to address these issues with fervor and inspiration.

It is important to notice though, that at this point, all the goals of this movement have not been reached. There is still a great deal of work to be done. We can all find a role in this work, if we engage ourselves in any way, may it be through discussions with fellow students, participation in activities and events, or critical self-assessment.

Integral to this work is to have a sense of humility, respect and a will to learn and listen. Together with passion and a readiness for conflict, this makes for smart activism. I do not share all the sentiments expressed by the individuals in this movement. I will not automatically endorse just any activity, without considering the impact. This movement consists of individuals, and therefore there will be conflicts. It would be also be foolish to believe that the inequalities that are prevalent in the greater society will not show themselves in the internal work of this movement.

I want to talk to you; my friends, colleagues, fellow students. I want you to challenge my view, I want you to question me. Call me out on my inconsistencies. I am not a morally high-standing individual that wants to lecture you about what you ought to believe. I want change and I want action to further this change.

Yesterday, president Pelton wrote:

"Recent events have tested the measure of who we are and what we stand for as a commonwealth of learning. We now have the opportunity to consider with deliberation and thoughtfulness how we can do better."

Last week mattered. Now let’s go on with this.

Mycket intressant!

2006-11-11T16:23:00.000-08:00

http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=574&a=587345&previousRenderType=3

Nr 4

2006-10-30T23:43:00.000-08:00

Response Paper- Eley chapter 12

It is certainly interesting to read about how “western feminisms maximum program” came to be realized only in the Soviet state in the mid-war period, as is described in chapter 12 of Eley's Forging Democracy. With its emphasis on forging equality, it would have made little sense for communism to not address the subordination of women. Yet the Bolshevik counterparts in other countries did exactly this, or let the question of gender equality take the less important role under the proletarian cause. Also, as was to be shown, rights and freedoms granted could easily be revoked in the authoritarian Soviet state.
Although the radical approaches of the leftist movement were promising for women of this era who had much to win and little to lose, the lesson was learned then that is learned in these times as well, throughout the world: women’s liberation would not be given, but taken. The political freedoms granted by the men in charge meant little before these could be realized by a majority of women in everyday life. As older structures were smashed, the powerful patriarchy was still upheld, and is so today.
Therefore, when opportunity arose for individual choice and identity making through consumer culture, women quickly took this opportunity. Although despised by many as mere illusions of freedom, the fact remained that young women were starting to make themselves seen in a way not before experienced.
It is often argued that capitalism is premised by the exploitation of women. I would beg to differ on this point. The way I see it, it is indeed true that pro-capitalist thinkers have often overlooked the problems with the sweeping generalizations about the nature of the individual (quietly presumed to be a white middle-class man). This does not, though, take away the fact that if the male dominance in society is combated with intellectual and political measures, the market forces can be a great tool for individual growth and female liberation. Capitalism, just as society at large, is dominated by men and therefore serves the purpose of them firstly. This situation is not a necessary prerequisite for a capitalist society though.

Debate article on sexism

2006-10-30T21:27:00.000-08:00

Here is a good debate article on the issue of sexism, by my friend Amutabi Haines.

http://www.wucollegian.com/media/storage/paper767/news/2006/10/25/Opinions/Overcome.Sexism.Through.Consciousness-2403607.shtml?norewrite200610310020&sourcedomain=www.wucollegian.com

Resonse Paper 3

2006-10-23T20:54:00.000-07:00

So this is kind of a very short response after the reading of Beryl Williams biography of Lenin.

Response Paper- Lenin by Beryl Williams

"In the long run […] the end did not justify the means."

As Beryl Williams points out in the opening chapter of his book, for the longest time the dominant view of Lenin and his legacy was that of a benevolent father of the revolution, a man who was never afraid to be rough but always fair. Stalin was considered to be his antithesis, a brute always rough and seldom fair. This view was not only prevalent in the areas of the Soviet Union, even I remember very well how this way of looking at the early soviet history would be dominant during my school years back in Sweden. Just as with many other historical periods there is a need to identify the villain and the hero, the good vs. the bad, and in the story of the Soviet Union these roles could easily be played by Lenin and Stalin.
With his book as only reference on the subject, it seems inevitable to come to any other conclusion than that of Beryl Williams when he says that if Lenin would have lived on he would certainly not have forwarded policies that would have been regarded as democratic in a western sense of the word. It can be argued, though, that whether or not his proposed society lives up to a western idea of the right or just society is of no importance in the context, because of the uniqueness of the Russian experience. The repression and brute force used by Lenin and the Bolsheviks could then be explained to have been necessary, understandable, or partly excused by the context. The reign of Lenin does not qualify, in my eyes, to be analyzed under this notion of moral relativism, just as little as Hitler’s third Reich, the Congo Free State of Leopold II or China under Mao. This is not to say that Lenin was better or worse than any of these rulers; to judge the comparable merit of different leaders based on how many million victims their policies created is a grotesque business, which leaves no relative lighter at heart.
Rather, I would argue, the reign of Lenin should be valued on whether or not it was humane, in the sense that it strived for the well-being of the whole society, of all humans in its reach. Clearly it did not, just as little as arguably almost every society in the history of mankind. With the role of the vanguard shifting from the proletarian class to the Bolshevik party to, arguably; Lenin, Leninism effectively swept away the basis for its existence. Lenin would have been valued, just as any other strong man or woman in the history of politics, as a hero or villain no matter his actions- the need for this dialectic lies deep in the mind of the western mindset- and as time went by he would indeed be graced with both epithets. As Williams writes, “his experiment lasted 74 years” . My hope is that the future historians will have less reason to explain the relative worth of different time periods depending on the merit of one person, as is the case of the Bolshevik rule.

Response Paper 2

2006-10-16T17:03:00.000-07:00

Here's number two from my socialism class, not really happy with it...

Response Paper- Jean Jaure
What does socialism presume about the nature of humans? People who find themselves studying the texts of the socialist tradition, and Marx and Engels in particular, often come to the conclusion that they like the idea of a socialist society, but that they do not have a sufficient belief in the good nature of humans to find it a possible system. To these persons, the socialist idea is believed to rest upon an idea of humanity that is fundamentally positive; people are interested in the welfare of others, therefore a political system where the strong would give up their privileges for the weak, or weakened, is possible. Liberalism, and the capitalist economy, is similarly thought to be built on ideals often regarded as selfish and therefore ugly. Is this the case?
To my understanding, after reading Jean Jaure, Marx never assumed anything about the nature of human morals. Rather, the human mind is in his theories formed by the economic relationships under which it is governed. In other words: society forms conscience. This has implications for the view mentioned above. The socialist society will work, according to Marx, not because people would be “nice” or willing to help, but because the people’s definition of reality would have changed. It is because of this that the dictatorship of the proletariat is needed; to form the minds of the citizens so that they do not regress to their old worldview, to their old wants. In the case of liberalism, to contrast, the nature of the human mind is believed to be made up by a core of moral or ethical values, which serve to guide the person, and the society in which the person exists.
What Jaure wanted to do with his text was to interpret Marx’ view of historical materialism with an idealistic view of progress. In his eyes, the history of humankind is undoubtedly one of progress, because all else would be contradictory to the nature of man. Can this view in fact be consolidated with Marx’ ideas? To me, the argument here becomes hard. By the maxim “tyranny must disappear by virtue of the play of forces, because these forces are men” , just about any regime can be accepted, it naturally seems, as long as society in some way moves forward. Some English theologians of the 19th century come into mind, who argued that all is well, because it is. By the well-meaning intention of adding some moral force to Marx’ argument, it feels like Jaure takes some of the edge off it. And indeed, this is the idea behind it, to give an argument for social democratic action instead of revolution. It can be argued that Jaure’s argument, just as the liberal argument, is more beautiful, but beauty- I believe- is not a factor that interested Marx.

Debate Article for the Collegian

2006-10-02T23:20:00.000-07:00

Following last weeks event about Emmet Till here at Willamette University (http://blog.willamette.edu/news/archives/2006/08/civil_rights_sp.php), I decided to write an opinion article for the Collegian, which is the student run weekly magazine for Willamette University students.

For more info on the case, see:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/till/

The Murder of Emmet Till and the Necessary Lessons to Learn

We have all been there. Been in a position where we wanted to speak up, say something that we really want to get out there, but then ended up backing down for whatever reason and just kept our mouth shut. I had one of those moments a week ago, at the University event The Murder of Emmet Till.
I had never heard about the fate of Emmet Till before I went to Smith auditorium last Tuesday. The kidnapping, torture and murder of the 14-year old Till in 1955, and the subsequent acquitting of his two captors, is one of the darkest chapters of the American history of racial oppression. As such, it also became one of the igniting factors of the civil rights movement. To hear about the events surrounding the history from the viewpoint of someone who was a close relative to Emmet and also a child at the time made the event all the more poignant. I would like to take this chance to say thank you to Wheeler Parker for sharing with us all who were there, and also to Olympia Vernon, for her readings and for making the event possible.
More than just a story from a dark past, the murder of Emmet Till must also serve as an important reminder about the structures of oppression still with us today in this country. At Willamette University, where a majority of students are white, this fact is not stressed enough. In order for the white community to approach the issue of racism, an understanding of the privilege that comes with color is needed; as a white person in America today, you are awarded with a privilege by the system. I am privileged because of the color of my skin, and I am not even a citizen of this country. To understand what this privilege consists of, you need to do little less than ask a person of color how often they are faced with having to think of their ethnic identity and color of skin during a normal day, something most white persons will hardly ever be faced with during their lifetime.
Racism is more than the Ku Klux Klan, more than crazy individuals with a discontent for people of color. Racism is a structure, a system of oppression, and we all have a part of it, whether or not we want to. As a white male, I am benefited by that system. That I benefit from that oppression makes me a racist. When I chose to not speak that night I acted in accordance with the privilege I have been bestowed. I can hear the truth, but ignore it, and still live on happily. What I want to forward in this short piece is a plea to everyone who identifies as white on this campus. Learn about your privilege, talk with your friends about it, and act. More than any other group, we have an obligation to work for the obliteration of racism. Realize that by the place you and I have been awarded in this system, we are made racist. It is up to us to change this fact. I learned about my privilege from a person of color. My hope is that a greater number of students will learn about their privilege from a white person. Then we will know that we have at least gotten something started.

Response 1

2006-09-26T00:20:00.000-07:00

So thisis the first response paper I have written in my class History of Modern Socialism. It handles the manifesto. I was really not happy about it, but I ended up with a good grade so I thought I'd post it. Expect more, and better stuff soon.

This is at least the third time I am being assigned the Communist Manfiesto, the whole or parts of it, as a reading for a class. The first time in high school, secondly at university in Sweden and then now. I have gone forward reading it with different goals each time. The first time with the hope of finding that the most important book of communism really did contain beautiful ideas, that the Soviet Union and the other oppressive regimes were not communist but had betrayed the original ideas. But, I never really understood the book then, and therefore my goal was not really fulfilled. I walked away from the reading with the notion of that there was a lot more to understand, before I could make myself an opinion. The second time I went about reading it with a critical eye, seeking out the parts that were the most appalling and anti-liberal, to support my newly adapted libertarian ideas. This time, I have no idea what my goal is. Therefore I have approached the book in a more open manner, still critical, but with a deeper understanding of not only the world in which it was written, but of Marx and Engels themselves.
Things stand a lot clearer to me this time. The Manifesto is a powerful work of political philosophy. It is hard to read it without being shaken to some degree, may it be positive or negative. What stands out to me during this reading is the emphasis that is put on the development of the class society, its historical inevitability, and the roles of the different classes in this development; in other words the very essence of the book, the full meaning of which I have never quite understood. The use of language is highly interesting. Marx does not talk about the development of society in the past or future tense, but in the present, which surrounds his argument with an aura of universal meaning and importance (yet in the context of the industrialized world). I understand more clearly the dynamics this time. The Manifesto is not against development, it is a battlecry to the proletariat to rise up and take control of this development. The importance of the Manifesto to the social democratic movement stands more clearly as well. The social democratic mass movements of western Europe might nowadays be less inclined to talk about Marx and Engels, but in this manifesto one finds the very core of their struggle, the base upon which they built their revolution. And a revolution it was, although it spanned over a long time. The revolution as it came about did not abolish the bourgeoise, nor its fundamental modes of power, but rather it took advantage of these to benefit the working classes. The revolution was therefore not only against the bourgeoisie but even more so, with it.
Does this mean that the social democratic movement has done nothing but conserve the old relationships of power? Are they, under Marx’ analysis, class-traitors? Here it is necessary to become practical and look to the actual gains made by the workers during the 20th century. In Sweden, along with a number of west European countries, the laboring classes rose to a standard of living in the 20th century that was never before seen. Sure enough, the old structures of power were still there, but the population was getting so well off that it was a fact that was hard to ignore. Whether or not Marx could have lived with that is a question that can never be answered. One way of seeing it would be that the western world has developed because of its exploitation of the rest of the world. Then solely the perverted capitalism of the nation-states and not the social movements would be responsible. But in the latest decades it can be shown that the overwhelming majority of the worlds countries have gone forward together, and lately the developing world has done so in a faster pace than the West.
As the development goes on, the welfare state with its regulations is being put under pressure. The day that this welfare state crumbles, and if that brings with it that the majority of people are left in a worse state than before, then Marx should once again be considered, because this would show that more drastic measures than those of the social democrats would be needed and that socialism did not only serve a part in a strictly confined historical period.

2006-09-21T22:36:00.000-07:00

Weltschmerz (..) is a term coined by the German author Jean Paul and denotes the kind of feeling experienced by someone who understands that the physical reality can never satisfy the demands of the mind.(..) It is also used to denote the feeling of sadness when thinking about the evils of the world.(..) The modern meaning of Weltschmerz in the German language is the psychological pain caused by sadness, that can occur when realizing that someone's own weaknesses are caused by the inappropriateness and cruelty of the world and (physical and social) circumstances. Weltschmerz in this meaning can cause depression, resignation and escapism, and can become a mental problem (compare to Hikikomori).

-Wikipedia

Sa sant

2006-05-07T13:22:00.000-07:00

"- Tänk när utanförskapet försvinner, då kan vi snacka om förändring på gräsrotsnivå. Förändring kommer inte uppifrån, det är ingen integrationsminister som förändrar den enskildes situation. Det måste komma från varje individ"
- Farid Nolen i DN

http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=147&a=543018&previousRenderType=1&ticker=147

Fraga

2006-05-05T20:33:00.000-07:00

Vet svenskarna om att Sverige ar ett invandrarland, fullt i klass med USA i borjan 1900-talet? 12% av Sveriges befolkning ar fodd utomlands..
Jag hade inte en aning om att andelen var sa stor. Det ar fantastiskt vad man kan fa reda pa nar man skriver en uppsats om sitt hemland har borta.
Mer pa detta amne snart.

Final Review

2006-04-28T11:11:00.000-07:00

I have now finished my last review for Capitalism & Democracy class. It serves as a broad concluding statement, and talks a little about the future. Voila:

Critical Review V: Conclusion
To conclude entails, more than just summarizing, to also look forward and try to make out what the future may have in store. Authors may come to the same conclusions about the past, but have radically different ideas for the future, and vice versa. This is indeed true for the writers whose concluding chapters are assigned for the last meeting of this class.
When Friedman wrote his Capitalism & Freedom in the early 1960’s he did so in an environment in which he identified two threats to the preservation and expansion of freedom. The first external threat was that of the Soviet Union. The second, the internal threat, was that of “men of good will and good intentions that wish to reform us” .These men of good will were a threat not because of the end goals they had in sight, but because of the means they would want to employ to reach these goals; the power of the state.
More than 40 years later, when Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle conclude their book, they also identify a threat. Their enemy, though, is on the other side of the spectrum. They are the followers of Friedman’s ideas, the people who took his and others ideas and put them into practice. Friedman’s “glimmerings of change” are to these authors “[…] a freedom movement of the […] most perverse sort” .
We live today in a world where the ruling discourse or paradigm without much of a doubt is that of free markets and limited governmental intervention. That there has been a paradigm change becomes evident, especially when one reads the words of Friedman, who argues in 1962 that the proponents of free markets and limited government are still on the defensive. Not many would argue that such is the case today. Fukuyama’s “end of history” is not a counterrevolutionary statement, but one hailing the dominant thought.
The countermovement of today is one that tries to halter this development, to bring back a more collectivist stance to politics, may it be through or outside of the state. The economically rational person is to Dryzek certainly not an enlightened individual, as liberals would argue, but a direct threat to the workings of a democratic society. He argues for a reconsolidation of the nation-states and other measures to form a reaction to globalization, and further the thought of democratic governance in all areas. Instead of arguing for a widespread revolution, he sees this development coming about naturally, as the resources of the world are coming closer to depletion.
Dryzek’s ecological standpoint would most likely send shivers down Friedman’s spine. What he opposes, Friedman would argue, is not only the exploitation of natural resources, but development in general. The curbs on rational egoism that he argues for, would be a curb on the instinctively human efforts to develop and further themselves.
These three authors share a common apprehension, and that is the concentration of power. Fraser and Gerstle, along with Dryzek, see this concentration coming about as the result of the very ideas that Friedman argue would disperse the concentration. The reason for this seemingly contradictory situation can be found at the very heart of their ideas and chosen instruments for evaluation. It is a conflict between homo economicus and homo politicus.
We stand now, not so much at a crossroad, but in an intersection of an infinite amount of roads to follow. The nature of the result of this situation is more likely to be a Hegelian synthesis than a definite end of history.

My Progressive Values

2006-04-26T21:43:00.000-07:00

So, we were asked to write about our progressive values for my class Examining Progressive Values. Here it is- a lot of rambling, I must admit, and the quality of the work is so and so. But what the hell.

My Progressive Values

Johan Norberg, the prominent Swedish liberal political theorist and pro-globalization activist, starts his book In Defense of Global Capitalism with a little story from his adolescent years. The scene is a high school in a suburb of Stockholm, and the young Norberg and his friend Markus are putting up posters for the upcoming school election. Not satisfied with any of the traditional alternatives- the leftists are state-centered and the right wing people are snobs- they have chosen to start their own party; the Anarchistic Front. Their platform is hugely popular with the students, but the teacher’s find it appalling. The boys are called into the principal’s office to hear a rant about respect and proper behavior. Yet- come election day- the result is clear. They have won an outstanding victory: 25% of the votes, with the social democrats second with 19%!
It might seem strange that someone who is an adherent to the ideas of classical liberalism and an outspoken defender of globalization to talk about his anarchistic past. But, as he continues his story we understand why he is telling it. Norberg could as a kid not understand why the world had to be divided with boundaries, why he had to be ruled by 349 persons in the assembly in Stockholm, why he could not choose where or how to live his own life, why families were kicked out of Sweden because there was no room for them. Anarchism offered an alternative. Later on though he realized that the best response could not be found in the ideas of anarchism, because of the weird premises that had to be fulfilled for that theory to work. But the thoughts, the doubts, were still there.
Fast forward around ten years or so. My friends and I, redneck misfits in a school with mostly kids from middle class small town background, were putting up posters for Revolutionar Kommunistisk Ungdom, in English: Revolutionary Communist Youth. The posters didn’t survive very long. We were called anything between commie scum to nigger lovers. At this point, Sweden was grappling to handle the effects of economic crisis of the early 90’s. This, paired with an ever increasing acceptance of immigrants and refugees from countries most people 10 years before hardly even knew about, created an environment where nationalist and racist movements drew thousands of young men and women to their ranks. In a small town, you needed to take a stand. You were either left or right, pro-immigration or “pro-swedish”.
It didn’t take me long to understand that communism wasn’t exactly the right way to go, but I think I had always known that. It just felt great to be against something that we all knew was wrong, to provoke and to get response. That was junior high.
When I then came to high school I noticed that I was becoming less and less interested in everyday politics. I didn’t understand it, and I grew tired of all the kids who had distinct opinions about everything from pension systems to the proper organization of governmental authorities. It always seemed like they chose a side or party, and then stuck to that, no matter what. I thought politics was too advanced to understand, but I never really reflected on why I felt like that. I missed the questions that really shook me, the big questions.
Then came the time to pursue higher studies. The choice was evident for me. Although I felt disillusioned when it came to my personal political views I never considered to study anything else than politics. My first two years of university changed me in ways I never thought it would have done. Funnily enough, it was not so much because of the studies, but because of the amazingly interesting people I met. People with views that I had never even heard about, people with radically different backgrounds and experiences. The change didn’t really show itself until I took a year off from my studies though. Now I had a year to think about what I actually thought about the current debates, and I started to realize that I indeed had opinions. It was a remarkable discovery.
I found solace in the humanistic ideas of liberalism. The incredible trust in human ingenuity, personal responsibility and individual freedom of the libertarian ideas offered a powerful alternative to the paternalism that I found to be ever present in the Swedish welfare state.
In one way it felt a lot like those years in junior high, when I thought that I was part of something great, a movement which dared to question everything. Things started to make sense, and the solutions were suddenly evident. Needless to say, I ended up in debates. Fierce ones at times, but I stuck to what I believed in, defended my views with all my energy. And it was all great, as long as I talked to people who had similar knowledge as me. But when I came back to visit my friends they would always come with practical arguments that I had no idea to respond to. Sure, it was easy to argue about what benefits there would be for employment if Sweden’s rigid labor market laws were eased, but my friend Henrik who has been working as an electrician since he finished high shool could disarm my argument with one question: “Wait, does that mean that I would be fired more easily?” It is kind of hard to argue with a friend after he has said something like that, and you yourself know that you have a very different life than him waiting around the corner.
I have been rambling on about my life for a good three pages now, and you might wonder if I will ever get to the point: what are my progressive values?
If progressivism denotes what I believe it does; a belief in public policies that further social change, it is hard to say that I do not have any progressive values. Yet that is what someone thought that my point would be with this paper, since I call myself a libertarian.
Such is not the case. I do believe that we need to face the systematic oppression of women and other groups within our society with everything we have, and in many cases the state can be a proper way of handling these problems. Then many of my libertarian or liberal friends would say that I betray my beliefs, but I will never concede to that. My beliefs are my beliefs. If you don’t want to call me a libertarian I am fine with that. I know what it means to me.
I am necessarily pragmatic, because I realize that all grand theories rest on premises and these premises will never be fully satisfied. To be a libertarian for me is to believe in the coming of a world where the individual is always valued highest, where one is free to make whatever one wants of ones life, and where borders and oppressive states no longer exist. To reach that goal we might have to adopt progressive policies, but I will never forget why I believe in what I believe in, and the individual perspective will always be there.
I do not believe in the market forces because I see them working to support a certain group of people or interest, but I believe in them because I see them as an amazing resource or opportunity for development and for the furthering of individual’s personal abilities. People may argue that I am inconsistent, and so be it. As long as I am sure that what I believe. That is why I can call myself a capitalist and a feminist and still be happy with it.

Friedman nr 2

2006-04-21T10:48:00.000-07:00

And here comes the second one!

Critical Review: The Liberal Alternative, Part III: Welfare and Inequality

To Friedman, a believer in the market forces and limited government, the question of welfare and inequality is necessarily guided by three central concepts (as pointed out by Cohen): equality of opportunity, justice and personal freedom.
Friedman starts of his discussion with talking about the capitalist ethical principle: “To each according to what he and the instruments he owns produces”[1]. In difference to Marx and his principle of “to each according to need, from each according to ability”, he does not hold it as a guiding moral or ethical principle. He does not say whether or not it is justified in itself, but as a mean to a higher end it surely is. The defense of inequality of wealth that this principle entails might be considered immoral, but it is essential to Friedman, since it in fact is a defense of personal freedom from the coercive forces of the redistributing state.
For Cohen, this argument is flawed. To him, private property can never be considered a part of personal freedom, since it is exclusionary, and therefore hurting other people’s freedom.[2] One need not go to the extent of arguing for abolition of property to argue against Friedman though, but it is an interesting critique. It is a critique that brings out the radical foundation of Marxist theory, that property, and property accumulation, is unjust. In that light, Friedman’s critique of the Marxist idea of labor exploitation- that the idea is flawed since it rests on the capitalist ethic- is of less importance, although it shows an inconsistency in Marx’ ideas. To Cohen, the problem is not that the workers do not get the same chance of accumulating property, but the fact that property as such exists. Friedman would most likely answer this critique with more practically grounded arguments. As he points out: “The great achievement of capitalism has not been the accumulation of property” [..].[3] The whole discussion is to him rather pointless if one looks at the actual results of capitalism- it’s actual bridging of inequalities and the opportunities it has offered to persons.
In order to fully accept the capitalist ethic a premise must be held as true. This is that all players in the market are there on equal terms- that they all have equal opportunities. Friedman equals personal endowments with wealth. In doing so, it seems like he forwards a kind of social Darwinism that many would, and, indeed, have argued against. As usual, it is also important to consider the premises for his arguments. If one were to accept his social Darwinist approach, then this entails that the society or market must in every case be regarding the players of the market as perfectly equal. Is this true, or even more interesting; desirable? As Bowles & Gintis points out in their evaluation of Marx, the liberal notion of equality is one that makes sense in the liberal utopia, but hardly in real life. The equality of opportunity argument is flawed in the current setting, because the way that equality is measured is necessarily grounded in a patriarchic, bourgeois worldview.[4] The feminist slogan “the private is political” can once again be brought up as a forceful critique against Friedman, especially if one considers his use of the family as an economic unit.
The question of most interest to me, after having done these readings, concerns the perceived conflict in Marx’ ideas about exploitation and private property. If it is indeed true, as Friedman points out, that the idea of exploitation actually rests on the capitalist ethic, that the worker is entitled to what he produces, then what implications does this have for the Marxist idea of the abolition of property? This is a question I am hoping that we can evolve in class.
[1] Friedman 161f
[2] Cohen 1981
[3] Friedman 1981 p. 169
[4] Bowles & Gintis 1986 p. 18

Friedman nr 1

2006-04-21T10:46:00.000-07:00

So, I thought I'd post the two latest critical reviews I have written in my Capitalism & Democracy. They are both concerning Milton Friedmans book Capiutalism & Freedom, and they handle social issues. Enjoy!

Friedman- Social Policy

The liberal free market idea is in the works of Milton Friedman not only applied to the world of economics. It is a principle which for him would ideally govern almost every aspect of the society’s workings. He offers an alternative not only to socialist ideas, but also to the conservatives. He criticizes the idea of state intervention to counter discrimination and inequality not because he believes that these phenomenons are a natural or desirable part of the society, but because he does not think that state intervention is the desirable cure.
The obvious path for any critic to choose when arguing against Friedman’s ideas would be to question the assumptions underlining the argument. As Friedman is very aware of, a great deal of his arguments make little practical sense unless one presumes full information on part of the actors involved, and that these act rationally. In some instances this becomes painfully clear, as when he is arguing that the direct costs for schooling would make parents budget and reduce the number of children they are getting. Most parents, especially in the 1960’s when the book was written, would probably not think in these terms when they were getting children.
It is interesting, then, to consider what relative value his arguments have on these terms. The structural inequalities pointed out by socialist and feminist theorists are undoubtedly there. But is the individual or the communal perspective most efficient to use to handle these inequalities? Friedman argues that the capitalist economy has managed, more so than the state, to bridge inequalities and reduce discrimination. The market is according to him blind when it comes to issues of skin color or religion. Further on he argues that the market is the best at handling these inequalities, as long as rational economic thinking prevails, since discrimination greatly limit’s a person’s choice in the market. By not instituting legislation in the area of labor discrimination, but instead showing that it is in fact inefficient one could easily handle the problem.
Probably the most forceful critique that can be pointed against Friedman comes from the feminist camp. Friedman argues that as long as the rational thought rules supreme and every man is considered equal, prosperity awaits. It is a philosophy written by a man, to be read by men. As Ellen Meiksins Wood would be quick to point out, by focusing on the passive rights of the individual, liberalism helps to take the edge of, and contain, the most pressing revolutions- “[…] stopping them short of exceeding acceptable boundaries”.[1] Many, as Adam Przeworski, would question Friedman’s arguments on the ground that his perfect market would never arise. To theorists like Wood though, the very problem is the market, because of it’s inherently male nature.
It is up to one’s imagination to wonder whether or not Friedman would find it beneficial to use state intervention in order to further women’s possibilities and relative competitiveness in the market. He is clearly willing to accept government intervention in the area of schooling to bridge economic and racial inequalities. Is the lack of a gender perspective because of the fact that it wasn’t really a question when he was writing, or is it because he views this discriminatory relationship as different?
Even though attacked from the point of practicalities, it is important to note that Friedman’s theories serve to put the light on the fact that state intervention must not be the only way to go, and that it works in a theoretical context. It is necessarily normative and does not serve to explain society. It is still valid to ask though what importance these theories have, since he seems to be overlooking a fundamental part of the workings of society; the discrimination of women. It is clearly easy to argue on the grounds of rationality, the question is though whether or not male economic rationality is always beneficial for women.
[1] Wood, 1995 p. 230

Why I put more effort into acting class than any other class I am taking

2006-04-11T22:23:00.000-07:00

Ok, so we have to do character analyses for my acting class. The first one was hard to do, But when I was asked to write one for my monologue, taken from WTC View, by Brian Sloan, the words came easily. The text covers a subject that we all can relate to.
Having not seen the actual play nor movie it is interesting to see how I chose to think about Max, which is apparently quite different from the original.
Here it goes:

I am Max. There is nothing very special about me. I mean, I am like any other working guy in their twenties, apart from the fact that I live in New York. I work on Manhattan, with a job that I am not really sure what I think about. I mean, it’s all right, but it’s not what I want to do for the rest of my life. Right now it’s fine though. I meet a lot of cool people and it gives me enough money to be able to have a good time and raise hell on the weekends.
In this city there are thousands and thousands more of me. Young guys, earning a buck and just enjoying the fact that they live in the center of the modern world. I mean- this is it- this is where shit happens! I love it here. When I look back on all those years I lived at home I kind of freak out, thinking about what it must have been like if I had stayed there for the rest of my life. I came here for a reason. There were so many things that I could have done, that would have been “the right thing to do”-you know the whole you can’t avoid your responsibilities forever kind of shit- but I knew I had to come here. And I mean, I am in my twenties, I earn well, I am single and I date guys. That’s what a guy in my age should do.
I have always felt that I had the ability to do something great, just that I never found out what it was. I used to think that someday something would trigger me to release whatever I had stored in me. That day never really came. But when I came to this city I thought that that didn’t really matter any more, because here I found greatness everywhere. The bare fact that I came here and not those other bastards from my high school seemed like a victory big enough. But you know, the rock star dream was still lurking there.
The biggest thing about that day is that I realized something. I realized that it wasn’t like in Hollywood. It wasn’t about bravery, action or whatever the fuck else. It was about people burning, throwing themselves out of windows, breaking down on the street after receiving news. It was like fucking Somalia. And the worst part I think is, that it didn’t change my life in all aspects. I still have the same job; I still walk down Sixth Avenue every day. What happened that day now just seems like a terrible nightmare that will spring into my mind now and then. I was part of all of that, but I am still Max from there and there, making a living in New York. And knowing that the deaths of 3000 people in the midst of my little world haven’t changed that is just as scary as it is comforting.

Fy for feg-Sverige

2006-02-09T23:56:00.000-08:00

Angaende SD-kurirens publicering av Muhammed-karikatyr:

"- Det är fruktansvärt att en liten grupp svenska extremister utsätter svenskar för en uppenbar fara, säger utrikesminister Laila Freivalds."
-DN 10 feb

Jag har en ide. Om nagon skulle vara beredd att finansiera det, sa skulle jag vilja aka tillbaka till Sverige, starta en hemsida och dar lagga upp karikatyrbilder pa alla religiosa profiler jag kan tanka mig. Detta skulle forhoppningsvis foljas av en aktion fran SAPO och en anmalan for hets mot folkgrupp. Sedan skall jag ansoka om politisk asyl i USA.

Jag ar saker pa att den politiska eliten i Sverige officiellt har forfarat sig over debatten om avlyssning i USA pa senare tid. Visst ar det hemskt nar lander trampar pa principer av sakerhetspolitiska skal.
-Mans

Hepp

2006-02-02T23:03:00.000-08:00

Okay, I have decided that everything I write from now on will be available to read in this blog. First up, a little response from a discussion board that has been set up for my class Examining Progressive Values.

One of the most beautiful views I have ever seen

2005-12-06T09:44:00.000-08:00

Crater Lake, Oregon, USA

Procrastination/laziness

2005-12-04T23:26:00.000-08:00

Yeah....

11 days left of the semester, one term-paper, one smaller paper, two exams and a GIS project left to do before that. I might be lazy, leaving everything to the last minute, but I seriously do not know if I would have been able to do this any other way. Multitasking is not my strongest side. I just don't think it is one of my natural talents, and I am not afraid to admit that.
Looking forward to writing my thesis next fall. 10 weeks of time that I am free to structure in any way I want. That's how I like it.
In many ways I just think I am tired of studying, which is funny, since I took a year off to find some inspiration.

So, politics right now.. Had a good talk about free trade the other night, made me think a lot about my arguments.
Went to a Q&A with Colin Powell on friday night. He is certainly a good speaker. Would be strange if he was not. He has a certain aura of authority, typical for people with military background. I Was just waiting for him to say shut up hippie!

Welcome/Wollstonecraft

2005-10-10T18:13:00.000-07:00

Okej, har startat min forsta blogg. Mycket spannande ma jag saga. Tanker inte ta tid till att forklara varfor, utan ni far helt enkelt noja er med det faktum att den nu finns har. Ser detta som ett utomordentligt tillfalle att kultivera mitt ego.

Jobbar pa min uppsats om Mary Wollstonecraft. Funderar pa att utforma den som en pamflett riktad mot religiost motiverad politik.
Har kommit underfund med att jag inte kan vara religios i den judeo-kristna betydelsen av ordet. Intressant nog ar det mina politiska asikter som satter kappar i hjulet. Ingen forklaring av teodice-problemet har an sa lange ovartygat mig om att kristen tro stodjer principer hogre an de jag har funnit i den liberala teorin.