Thought I'd post some more essays from the past year. Here's one from a class in International Justice:
I. Introduction
In this essay I wish to investigate whether libertarianism can offer a coherent and convincing argument for open borders. I have for long found libertarianism to be a compelling idea, perhaps especially for what I perceived to be its principled positive approach towards free movement. I was therefore surprised to find that several authors have professed doubt in whether it really would support the free movement of individuals. This essay is not primarily concerned with the debate between libertarian and other theories who profess, or include amongst their supporters people who profess, a dedication to open borders. It is rather an attempt to understand whether a libertarian argument for open borders can make any sense.
The following is divided into two parts. In part two I first of all present Joseph Carens’ argument for why libertarianism supports open borders. I then move on to consider two separate counterarguments; those of Michael Walzer and Joseph Seglow. Relating this critique to a distinction between what John Rawls would call ideal and non-ideal theory, I then go on to explain why I think that these critiques do not manage to show that libertarianism does not support open borders. In part three I summarize my conclusions, and raise points of further interest which have struck me whilst writing, but which I have not been able to fit in to the discussion.
II. A Libertarian Argument for Open Borders
Joseph Carens enlists the help of Robert Nozick to point out that theories which place an emphasis on property rights cannot be successfully used to argue for border controls. This is due to a number of factors, most notably that libertarianism does not grant the state any right to interfere in contractual understandings between individuals (Carens, 1987, 332f). Furthermore, since libertarianism is concerned with individual property rights, it could not be used to argue for the protection of the state’s resources if these were to be understood as collective property, nor could it be used to argue for the protection of a specific group, since the state would then show an unjust preference for some over others (Ibid). However, even though Carens believes that the libertarian position does imply that states do not have a moral right to exclude immigrants, he does not think that the problem of exclusion as such would be avoided by the argument. The reason for this would be the significant power available to property holders to exclude others from their land, a power which they would have over citizens and non-citizens alike (Ibid, 333). Yet, even granted this possibility of exclusion, Carens still holds that libertarianism supports open borders. The exclusion which would be done by private property holders would be fundamentally different from that of the state’s illegitimate exclusion, since the latter is based on an idea of collective property (Ibid).
Jonathan Seglow questions Carens’ assertion and points to an argument forwarded by Hillel Steiner. (Seglow, 2005, 324). Steiner holds that libertarianism does not preclude the possibility of communities seceding from existing states and forming new political associations. These would have every right to exclude outsiders, granted that the territory upon which they reside is privately owned by the members of the association (Ibid). Seglow holds that these communities could be understood as states, and therefore concludes that “[l]ibertarianism hardly supports open borders” (Ibid). Seglow’s critique echoes concerns raised by Michael Walzer, who in his Spheres of Justice contends that a state which models its border controls on that of a neighbourhood association, i.e. with no legal right to exclude outsiders, will inevitably crumble and give way to smaller communities, with the result being not a borderless world, but rather a world with a near infinite amount of borders (Walzer, 1985, 38).
Do these observations damage Carens’, and in extension, Nozick’s arguments enough for us to conclude that libertarianism in fact does not support open borders? I would argue that they do not. In order to show why I think this is the case we first need to look at how Carens handles Walzer’s assertions about states as neighbourhoods.
In a direct response to Walzer, Carens questions the analogy of states as neighbourhoods and argues that open states could more correctly be understood as analogous to cities or provinces within a system like that in USA. Since freedom of movement overrides other claims within states, Carens sees no reason for why this freedom should not be extended across the borders of nation-states (Carens, 1987, 343). In another article, Carens also contests the idea that open borders would undermine the sovereignty of the state. He points to the example of the European Union, where a system of open borders has been established without the constituent states collapsing or even losing out significantly in terms of sovereignty (Carens, 1999, 1089). An apparent counterargument to this observation would be that the examples of cities, provinces and federations are still based on an idea which presumes an overarching authority with significant control over border admissions. The European Union, with its free internal mobility, still controls its borders and excludes thousands of people from entering every year. However, for someone who is concerned primarily with the moral argument for freedom of movement this critique could be easily countered; there is no reason to why a similar system like that of the European Union could not be extended to include all the states of the world. Libertarians would most likely find this to be a better solution than the current system of nation-states, granted that the new world-wide authority would be limited in its scope to enforcing the fundamental rights of individuals. Although there are a number of arguments which could be raised against this idea, and in favour of Walzer’s argument, these would tend to be connected to values and empirical issues which are not of direct interest in this setting, as we are mainly concerned here with the internal logic of the libertarian argument.
Seglow’s critique is more troubling and of a greater interest to the issue at hand, because whereas Walzer’s critique is based on the implications of the libertarian argument in the current world, Seglow points to a potential internal problem when the libertarian argument is taken to its full extension. As already mentioned above, Seglow’s assertion concerning the possibility of new states arising with theoretical rights of exclusion is based on an argument by Hillel Steiner. Although Steiner holds, in line with Carens, that in a world such as our own with disputed or morally imperfect property rights libertarians would not be able to argue for immigration restrictions, the case would be different, at least in outcome, if we would consider a perfect libertarian world (Steiner, 1992, 90). Here we are moving into what Rawls would call “ideal theory”. In such a situation all the other relevant libertarian preconditions would have been met; the appropriation of land and resources would have been carried out in a just fashion and all states would derive their property claims and grounds for existence from the collected properties and contractual obligations of its constituent members. Secession and exclusion would here be a distinct possibility, since the reason for keeping outsiders out would be derived from property claims (Steiner, 1992, 92f).
Prima facie, this seems to be quite damning for the prospect of open borders. However, I would like to argue that this argument holds less power than what one might at first think. Keep in mind that we are discussing a situation where the starting point would already be dramatically different from the world which we inhabit. Most likely, most states that exist in this current world would not exist under such conditions, nor is it likely that the distribution of resources would closely resemble that of our world. Seglow expresses concern that the right for communities to secede and form closed states would be rife in such a world. Yet, I would argue that Seglow’s image of the ideal libertarian situation is unjustifiably bleak. In such a setting it would be largely irrelevant to talk of the ideas of states or transnational immigration as we understand it in our current setting. Morally justified exclusion would only be possible if the community which was wishing to exclude others did so with the expressed consent of all of it constituent members. It is true that associations could choose to exclude outsiders, but it is just as likely, or perhaps more so, that they would choose not to. In any sense, I would argue that the claim that libertarianism does not support open borders is close to incoherent if we are arguing on the level of ideal theory, since the notions of states and borders would no longer be of primary interest, and political associations at least possibly would be much more fluid and prone to change in territorial respects.
III. Conclusions
I have found that libertarianism can offer a coherent argument for open borders. In the context of our current world order, which from a libertarian viewpoint is a less than an ideal situation, the argument would rest on the equal moral worth of each individual and the right to freedom of association and contract. Since the only powers ideally available to the state in libertarian theory are those of enforcing individual rights, and since the theory does not assign any fundamental value to claims which go beyond these rights, libertarians would most likely be in favour of a world-state with limited powers over a system of states as is currently the case.
Although there is a distinct possibility that in an ideal libertarian world closed communities could arise which would have a moral right to exclude outsiders, I do not believe that this assertion is reason enough to question the libertarian commitment to open borders. This is due to the fluidity of the outer demarcations of these communities which could change as soon as a member would choose to leave the community, join another or perhaps start their own.
There remains a point which I have not gone into in this essay, but that is worth mentioning. This is connected to the idea of the freedom to choose, start or leave political associations in the ideal libertarian situation. Since there is no form or size of association which can be considered to be ideal, the possibility could arise of political associations consisting of anything from a single individual to every person in the world. Without an overarching structure, i.e. a state or a world state to handle possible conflicts arising between these associations on contractual issues it is hard to see how these conflicts could be solved. I believe the problems connected to secession and the lack of a global mediator are not restricted to the libertarian idea, yet it does put these problems into focus. However, this is a question which is far too complex to look deeper into in this paper.
Bibliography
Carens, J.H. (1987) ‘Aliens and Citizens, the Case for Open Borders’. Review of Politics, vol. 49, 2, 251-273.
_________. (1999) ‘A Reply to Meilaender: Reconsidering Open Borders’. International Migration Review, vol. 33, 4, 1082-1097)
Seglow, J. (2005) ‘The Ethics of Immigration’. Political Studies Review, vol. 3, 3, 317-334.
Steiner, H. (1992) ‘Libertarianism and the Transnational Migration of People’. In Barry, B. & Goodin, R.E. (1992) Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Walzer, M. (1985) Spheres of Justice: a Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell.
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Monday, December 08, 2008
Rawls and Disability
All right, below is the first essay that I have handed in at UCL, for the class Contemporary Political Philosophy II with Jonathan Wolff. Grade received was surprisingly good, so I am quite happy. Feel free to comment if you have feel it is not too boring to read through.
For the purpose of his argument Rawls assumes that everyone in society is able-bodied. What complications arise when we accept that some are handicapped? Can Rawls approach be extended to deal with such cases?
I. Introduction
As pointed out by Will Kymlicka, John Rawls tries in A Theory of Justice to develop an alternative view to the prevailing view of equality of opportunity. Although positive to the general direction of Rawls’ argument, Kymlicka believes that it does not do enough to address inequalities based on differences in natural ability, and proposes an extension of Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity argument to compensate for natural inequalities on the same basis as social inequalities. I shall argue in this paper that although there is some weight to Kymlicka’s argument, I believe it rests on an oversimplification of Rawls’ ideas. In addition, I will introduce the “social model” argument, which states that the concept of disability is a social construct. I believe that there is a possibility that Rawls’ argument concerning disability can be strengthened by a partial accommodation of the social model argument.
The rest of the essay is divided into three parts. In section II I will outline and asses Kymlicka’s critique. In section III I will introduce the social model approach and present the consequences this might have for Rawls’ argument. For the purpose of the discussion, I will in the first part of the essay consistently use the word disability in its broad meaning, encompassing other terms such as handicap and impairment. However, as already hinted, section III includes a discussion about an existing conceptual dispute, which will lead me to question this use.
II. Defending Rawls on his own terms
In Contemporary Political Philosophy Will Kymlicka offers a critique of John Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism as defined in A Theory of Justice and other works. Of particular interest for the topic of this essay is Kymlicka’s focus on what he views as Rawls’ inconsistent use of primary goods and the problems entailed with this approach when one considers natural inequalities. In the context of his social contract argument Rawls introduces the concept of primary goods; “(…) things that every rational man is presumed to want (…) that have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls, 1999, 54). Rawls further distinguishes between social and natural goods. Liberties, rights, opportunities, income and wealth and the social bases of self-respect are social goods; these are under control of society. Natural goods such as health, vigor, intelligence and imagination are not controlled by - but are influenced by - societal structures (Ibid, Kymlicka 2002, 64-65). Rawls argues that in the original position, the participants will strive to establish a society where the social primary goods are most easily accessed by all, and where no one is unfairly benefited by virtue of their natural primary goods (Kymlicka, 2002, 70). In other words, any benefit in terms of social goods which individuals receive due to their talent or intelligence etc. must be weighed up by an equal or greater benefit to those who are the least well-of in terms of social goods. This view is one that Kymlicka shares. However, he recognizes that there remains a problem. The prevailing view is that Rawls does not factor in natural disadvantages as grounds for compensation. This has the effect that a person who is for instance severely disabled can be seen to be just as well of as a healthy person who has the same amount of primary social goods, and indeed better off than a much healthier person who has marginally less (Ibid.). As Kymlicka points out, this does not seem fair when we consider that ill health is likely to mean that unhealthy people will incur costs which healthy people do not, thus leaving them with less disposable income, and most likely lesser quality of life (Ibid, 70ff). If we consider that a handicap or disease is likely to have an effect on one’s general quality of life already in itself, this seems even less fair. Kymlicka’s solution to this perceived flaw in Rawls’ theory is rather simple. He proposes that it should be restated so that natural inequalities will be made into grounds for compensation just like social inequalities (Ibid, 72). However, he hints that the problems arising upon application might be quite significant, and that this could be the reason for Rawls’ avoidance of this type of solution (Ibid, 77).
Is Kymlicka’s critique fair? Yes and no. I believe that a broader reading of Rawls gives us reason to argue that Kymlicka’s critique in some senses is misguided. John Rawls did not completely overlook the question of disability and other natural inequalities. As Kymlicka rightly points out, in TJ Rawls discusses, and eventually rejects, a principle of redress (Ibid, 98). This is in Rawls own words defined as: “(…) the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowments are uncalled for, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for” (Rawls, 1999, 86). Prima facie, this looks a lot like Kymlicka’s proposed solution. However, Kymlicka argues that Rawls is right in rejecting the principle, as compensation should not be given primarily to level comparative advantages in ability, but in order to give the disabled “(…) the same ability to lead a satisfying life” (Kymlicka 2002, 99). Kymlicka’s reasoning here seems a little confused. Even though Rawls rejects the principle of redress he claims that the difference principle in many instances acts towards the same goal. In the example of education he argues that resources should be focused to better the situation for the least advantaged students. Furthermore, he claims that education should not be focused solely on producing efficient, productive citizens, but that a wider approach is necessary in order to provide for a development of self-esteem (Rawls, 1999, 87). In other words, the natural inequality of - for instance - learning difficulties is to be compensated for in terms of a directed distribution of social goods towards the least advantaged, not only for them to become as productive as others, but to provide the grounds for a fuller life. Furthermore, if we argue that disability s likely to have an effect on a person’s ability to learn and develop, not only directly, but also indirectly, by for instance being disadvantaged in terms of access to school buildings and other resources, Kymlicka’s and Rawls’ arguments seem identical. I believe that Rawls’ proposal for aimed redistributive measures is open for such an interpretation. It is thus unclear how Rawls view is different from the solution proposed by Kymlicka, at least when applied to the example of education.
As the observant reader might now object, the above discussion presupposes that Rawls’ takes into account disability, i.e. that he does not base his theory on a premise that everyone is able-bodied. I believe that there is reason to question whether or not this is entirely true. In an essay written after the publication of TJ Rawls states the following;
It is best to make an initial concession in the case of special health and medical needs. I put this difficult problem aside in his paper and assume that all citizens have physical and psychological capacities within a certain normal range. I do this because the first problem of justice concerns the relations between citizens who are normally active and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life (Sen & Williams, 1982, 168).
Now, a broad definition of disability encompasses a wide range of imparities, including not only severe mental and physical handicaps but also temporary or less severe conditions. Consider for example an amputee; missing a foot, hand or arm. Although this condition is one that I believe most people would classify as a disability, with the added problems in everyday life arising from such a condition, it is hard to see how it would render the person unable to be a “fully cooperating and active member of society”. It can of course be argued that a person’s disability is likely to have a different impact depending on what supportive structures are already in place; being an amputee in Liberia or Tibet can be assumed to be quite a different affair than being one in Japan or Great Britain. However, due to the openness and ambiguity inherent in the above statement I see no difficulty in applying a contemporary, empirically based view which can have the effect of including a great number of disabilities in the “normal range”. It would, quite rightly, be viewed as almost grotesque to argue that a wheel-chair borne accountant or a blind radio DJ would not be able to take part in a majority of societal affairs. Hence I conclude that the assertion that Rawls theory excludes everyone who is not able-bodied is one which can be questioned. There are of course some troubling exceptions left which gives weight to the view I am questioning, the most glaring such the issue of severe mental conditions. However, this does not fully refute my argument.
Let us focus again on Kymlicka’s critique. Can we argue that Kymlicka’s and Rawls’ arguments converge in other areas than education? As we have seen, the basis of Kymlicka’s argument lies in a questioning of what he sees as an arbitrary distinction made by Rawls between inequalities in natural and primary goods where the former is not grounds for compensation while the latter is (Kymlicka, 2002, 98). This leads Kymlicka to question why people discriminated against on basis of their social class or ethnic belonging are entitled to compensation when disabled persons are not (Ibid, 72). I believe this question to be misleading based on two reasons. Firstly, in Justice as Fairness – a Restatement Rawls states that on a basic interpretation of the difference principle the least advantaged are to be viewed as such simply based on their relative income and wealth. Claims for compensation based on gender or race are not to be valued independently of the claimant’s relative standing in terms of money, given that basic equal rights and liberties have already been assigned appropriately (Rawls, 2001, 59). Secondly, on a fuller understanding of the difference principle, where the social good of self-respect is central, I argue that Rawls can be understood to argue for compensation on grounds of gender and race as well as on grounds of disability, at least if we take compensation to mean indirect measures as opposed to cash handouts. Rawls stresses the importance of self-respect, defined as a sense of one’s own value and a confidence in one’s own ability, to be of such importance that “(…) the parties in the original position would wish at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine [it]” (Rawls, 1999, 386). If we assume that social conditions are such, that individuals are undervalued based on their disability, race or gender, not in terms of formal equal liberties and rights but in their general role as society members, it believe it safe to assume that their self-respect would be suffering and that a society based on Rawlsian principles would seek to do something about the situation.
In order to avoid the claim that I have made a straw-man out of Kymlicka’s argument, I will admit that the assertions I have forwarded in this section rest on a rather open reading of Rawls. As such, it might be argued that I have done little to show that Kymlicka is wrong in his critique. However, I do believe that there is reason to believe that a Rawlsian approach would be more attentive to the needs of persons with disabilities than has been suggested. This brings us on to our final section, where I will look at an alternative view of disability and the consequences this entails for our discussion.
III. The Social Model and Justice as Fairness
In order to draw attention to the issue of disability as a subject of political theory, which he believed to be one that traditionally has not been granted a prominent enough status, Peter Handley wrote an article on the social model of disability in 2003, in which he presents its main characteristics and sketches out some possible consequences for established political theory (Handley, 2003, 109f).
According to Handley, both Rawls and Kymlicka, and indeed a majority of political theorists, hold what he calls a “common-sense view of disability” (Ibid). This is the view that disability is in essence a medical issue, whereby it “(…) amounts to the reduction or absence of an individual’s physical, cognitive or sensory functions to the point that ‘normal’ functioning and capabilities are restricted or absent and that such states are entirely natural phenomena” (Ibid, 110). Contrasting this view, then, is the social model. This argument turns, much like feminist approaches, the argument around and holds that disability is a social construct. Whereas individuals can be impaired in one way or other, it is only in a social setting they are made disabled, as society is built on a norm of “fully functioning” or “able-bodied” individuals (Ibid, 111f). As Handley points out, it is fair to question whether such a norm is not false, considering that most people will at some point in their life be impaired in one way or another (Ibid, 115). At first sight, the social model seems to be quite damning for Rawls’ argument. However, as Handley points out, a complete acceptance of the social model and the resulting radical policy transformations is not needed, maybe even not beneficial, in order to effectively tackle the issue of disability. Handley thus proposes a middle ground view, where the social model can be used to identify areas where political action is needed, whilst retaining at least a partial acceptance of the medical view in order to alleviate some impairments (Ibid 113ff). Given the possibilities inherent in Rawls’ theories that I have outlined above, namely in his focusing on the social good of self-respect and the rather fluent concept of a “normal range” of capabilities, I believe that there is reason to believe that at least a partial combination of justice as fairness and a revised social model can bring Rawls ideas to form the basis for a much more extensive egalitarian approach than has been previously thought, even by Rawls himself. This is however, a question which would need to be studied closer and as such it is beyond the scope of this essay.
Bibliography
Handley, P. (2003) Theorising Disability: Beyond Common Sense. Politics, 23, 2, 109-118.
Kymlicka, W. (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
______. (2001) Justice as Fairness – A Restatement. Cambridge, Massachusetts; The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Sen, A.K. & Williams, B. (eds.) (1982) Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
For the purpose of his argument Rawls assumes that everyone in society is able-bodied. What complications arise when we accept that some are handicapped? Can Rawls approach be extended to deal with such cases?
I. Introduction
As pointed out by Will Kymlicka, John Rawls tries in A Theory of Justice to develop an alternative view to the prevailing view of equality of opportunity. Although positive to the general direction of Rawls’ argument, Kymlicka believes that it does not do enough to address inequalities based on differences in natural ability, and proposes an extension of Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity argument to compensate for natural inequalities on the same basis as social inequalities. I shall argue in this paper that although there is some weight to Kymlicka’s argument, I believe it rests on an oversimplification of Rawls’ ideas. In addition, I will introduce the “social model” argument, which states that the concept of disability is a social construct. I believe that there is a possibility that Rawls’ argument concerning disability can be strengthened by a partial accommodation of the social model argument.
The rest of the essay is divided into three parts. In section II I will outline and asses Kymlicka’s critique. In section III I will introduce the social model approach and present the consequences this might have for Rawls’ argument. For the purpose of the discussion, I will in the first part of the essay consistently use the word disability in its broad meaning, encompassing other terms such as handicap and impairment. However, as already hinted, section III includes a discussion about an existing conceptual dispute, which will lead me to question this use.
II. Defending Rawls on his own terms
In Contemporary Political Philosophy Will Kymlicka offers a critique of John Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism as defined in A Theory of Justice and other works. Of particular interest for the topic of this essay is Kymlicka’s focus on what he views as Rawls’ inconsistent use of primary goods and the problems entailed with this approach when one considers natural inequalities. In the context of his social contract argument Rawls introduces the concept of primary goods; “(…) things that every rational man is presumed to want (…) that have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls, 1999, 54). Rawls further distinguishes between social and natural goods. Liberties, rights, opportunities, income and wealth and the social bases of self-respect are social goods; these are under control of society. Natural goods such as health, vigor, intelligence and imagination are not controlled by - but are influenced by - societal structures (Ibid, Kymlicka 2002, 64-65). Rawls argues that in the original position, the participants will strive to establish a society where the social primary goods are most easily accessed by all, and where no one is unfairly benefited by virtue of their natural primary goods (Kymlicka, 2002, 70). In other words, any benefit in terms of social goods which individuals receive due to their talent or intelligence etc. must be weighed up by an equal or greater benefit to those who are the least well-of in terms of social goods. This view is one that Kymlicka shares. However, he recognizes that there remains a problem. The prevailing view is that Rawls does not factor in natural disadvantages as grounds for compensation. This has the effect that a person who is for instance severely disabled can be seen to be just as well of as a healthy person who has the same amount of primary social goods, and indeed better off than a much healthier person who has marginally less (Ibid.). As Kymlicka points out, this does not seem fair when we consider that ill health is likely to mean that unhealthy people will incur costs which healthy people do not, thus leaving them with less disposable income, and most likely lesser quality of life (Ibid, 70ff). If we consider that a handicap or disease is likely to have an effect on one’s general quality of life already in itself, this seems even less fair. Kymlicka’s solution to this perceived flaw in Rawls’ theory is rather simple. He proposes that it should be restated so that natural inequalities will be made into grounds for compensation just like social inequalities (Ibid, 72). However, he hints that the problems arising upon application might be quite significant, and that this could be the reason for Rawls’ avoidance of this type of solution (Ibid, 77).
Is Kymlicka’s critique fair? Yes and no. I believe that a broader reading of Rawls gives us reason to argue that Kymlicka’s critique in some senses is misguided. John Rawls did not completely overlook the question of disability and other natural inequalities. As Kymlicka rightly points out, in TJ Rawls discusses, and eventually rejects, a principle of redress (Ibid, 98). This is in Rawls own words defined as: “(…) the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowments are uncalled for, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for” (Rawls, 1999, 86). Prima facie, this looks a lot like Kymlicka’s proposed solution. However, Kymlicka argues that Rawls is right in rejecting the principle, as compensation should not be given primarily to level comparative advantages in ability, but in order to give the disabled “(…) the same ability to lead a satisfying life” (Kymlicka 2002, 99). Kymlicka’s reasoning here seems a little confused. Even though Rawls rejects the principle of redress he claims that the difference principle in many instances acts towards the same goal. In the example of education he argues that resources should be focused to better the situation for the least advantaged students. Furthermore, he claims that education should not be focused solely on producing efficient, productive citizens, but that a wider approach is necessary in order to provide for a development of self-esteem (Rawls, 1999, 87). In other words, the natural inequality of - for instance - learning difficulties is to be compensated for in terms of a directed distribution of social goods towards the least advantaged, not only for them to become as productive as others, but to provide the grounds for a fuller life. Furthermore, if we argue that disability s likely to have an effect on a person’s ability to learn and develop, not only directly, but also indirectly, by for instance being disadvantaged in terms of access to school buildings and other resources, Kymlicka’s and Rawls’ arguments seem identical. I believe that Rawls’ proposal for aimed redistributive measures is open for such an interpretation. It is thus unclear how Rawls view is different from the solution proposed by Kymlicka, at least when applied to the example of education.
As the observant reader might now object, the above discussion presupposes that Rawls’ takes into account disability, i.e. that he does not base his theory on a premise that everyone is able-bodied. I believe that there is reason to question whether or not this is entirely true. In an essay written after the publication of TJ Rawls states the following;
It is best to make an initial concession in the case of special health and medical needs. I put this difficult problem aside in his paper and assume that all citizens have physical and psychological capacities within a certain normal range. I do this because the first problem of justice concerns the relations between citizens who are normally active and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life (Sen & Williams, 1982, 168).
Now, a broad definition of disability encompasses a wide range of imparities, including not only severe mental and physical handicaps but also temporary or less severe conditions. Consider for example an amputee; missing a foot, hand or arm. Although this condition is one that I believe most people would classify as a disability, with the added problems in everyday life arising from such a condition, it is hard to see how it would render the person unable to be a “fully cooperating and active member of society”. It can of course be argued that a person’s disability is likely to have a different impact depending on what supportive structures are already in place; being an amputee in Liberia or Tibet can be assumed to be quite a different affair than being one in Japan or Great Britain. However, due to the openness and ambiguity inherent in the above statement I see no difficulty in applying a contemporary, empirically based view which can have the effect of including a great number of disabilities in the “normal range”. It would, quite rightly, be viewed as almost grotesque to argue that a wheel-chair borne accountant or a blind radio DJ would not be able to take part in a majority of societal affairs. Hence I conclude that the assertion that Rawls theory excludes everyone who is not able-bodied is one which can be questioned. There are of course some troubling exceptions left which gives weight to the view I am questioning, the most glaring such the issue of severe mental conditions. However, this does not fully refute my argument.
Let us focus again on Kymlicka’s critique. Can we argue that Kymlicka’s and Rawls’ arguments converge in other areas than education? As we have seen, the basis of Kymlicka’s argument lies in a questioning of what he sees as an arbitrary distinction made by Rawls between inequalities in natural and primary goods where the former is not grounds for compensation while the latter is (Kymlicka, 2002, 98). This leads Kymlicka to question why people discriminated against on basis of their social class or ethnic belonging are entitled to compensation when disabled persons are not (Ibid, 72). I believe this question to be misleading based on two reasons. Firstly, in Justice as Fairness – a Restatement Rawls states that on a basic interpretation of the difference principle the least advantaged are to be viewed as such simply based on their relative income and wealth. Claims for compensation based on gender or race are not to be valued independently of the claimant’s relative standing in terms of money, given that basic equal rights and liberties have already been assigned appropriately (Rawls, 2001, 59). Secondly, on a fuller understanding of the difference principle, where the social good of self-respect is central, I argue that Rawls can be understood to argue for compensation on grounds of gender and race as well as on grounds of disability, at least if we take compensation to mean indirect measures as opposed to cash handouts. Rawls stresses the importance of self-respect, defined as a sense of one’s own value and a confidence in one’s own ability, to be of such importance that “(…) the parties in the original position would wish at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine [it]” (Rawls, 1999, 386). If we assume that social conditions are such, that individuals are undervalued based on their disability, race or gender, not in terms of formal equal liberties and rights but in their general role as society members, it believe it safe to assume that their self-respect would be suffering and that a society based on Rawlsian principles would seek to do something about the situation.
In order to avoid the claim that I have made a straw-man out of Kymlicka’s argument, I will admit that the assertions I have forwarded in this section rest on a rather open reading of Rawls. As such, it might be argued that I have done little to show that Kymlicka is wrong in his critique. However, I do believe that there is reason to believe that a Rawlsian approach would be more attentive to the needs of persons with disabilities than has been suggested. This brings us on to our final section, where I will look at an alternative view of disability and the consequences this entails for our discussion.
III. The Social Model and Justice as Fairness
In order to draw attention to the issue of disability as a subject of political theory, which he believed to be one that traditionally has not been granted a prominent enough status, Peter Handley wrote an article on the social model of disability in 2003, in which he presents its main characteristics and sketches out some possible consequences for established political theory (Handley, 2003, 109f).
According to Handley, both Rawls and Kymlicka, and indeed a majority of political theorists, hold what he calls a “common-sense view of disability” (Ibid). This is the view that disability is in essence a medical issue, whereby it “(…) amounts to the reduction or absence of an individual’s physical, cognitive or sensory functions to the point that ‘normal’ functioning and capabilities are restricted or absent and that such states are entirely natural phenomena” (Ibid, 110). Contrasting this view, then, is the social model. This argument turns, much like feminist approaches, the argument around and holds that disability is a social construct. Whereas individuals can be impaired in one way or other, it is only in a social setting they are made disabled, as society is built on a norm of “fully functioning” or “able-bodied” individuals (Ibid, 111f). As Handley points out, it is fair to question whether such a norm is not false, considering that most people will at some point in their life be impaired in one way or another (Ibid, 115). At first sight, the social model seems to be quite damning for Rawls’ argument. However, as Handley points out, a complete acceptance of the social model and the resulting radical policy transformations is not needed, maybe even not beneficial, in order to effectively tackle the issue of disability. Handley thus proposes a middle ground view, where the social model can be used to identify areas where political action is needed, whilst retaining at least a partial acceptance of the medical view in order to alleviate some impairments (Ibid 113ff). Given the possibilities inherent in Rawls’ theories that I have outlined above, namely in his focusing on the social good of self-respect and the rather fluent concept of a “normal range” of capabilities, I believe that there is reason to believe that at least a partial combination of justice as fairness and a revised social model can bring Rawls ideas to form the basis for a much more extensive egalitarian approach than has been previously thought, even by Rawls himself. This is however, a question which would need to be studied closer and as such it is beyond the scope of this essay.
Bibliography
Handley, P. (2003) Theorising Disability: Beyond Common Sense. Politics, 23, 2, 109-118.
Kymlicka, W. (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
______. (2001) Justice as Fairness – A Restatement. Cambridge, Massachusetts; The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Sen, A.K. & Williams, B. (eds.) (1982) Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sunday, October 12, 2008
Re - Evaluation pt 1
Bam! Course work hit me like a shovel.
Back in academia-land. I tell you, it does feel a bit odd, yet strangely comforting to be there, head in book, and this time in yet another country. I am currently reading John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, Rawls' A Theory of Justice and some legal theory signed Hart and Dworkin.
As the title above suggests, I have also started to think quite a lot about my political views. I have decided to try and reset my compass and approach the readings assigned to me with an open mind. I have, as of now, no clue where I will end up on the spectrum after I come out on the other side of this. For now, all I want to do is learn as much as I possibly can. And, to judge from the the way the schedule looks and from the level that my class mates are on, it looks more than likely that I will get quite a lot of value for my money.
Back in academia-land. I tell you, it does feel a bit odd, yet strangely comforting to be there, head in book, and this time in yet another country. I am currently reading John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, Rawls' A Theory of Justice and some legal theory signed Hart and Dworkin.
As the title above suggests, I have also started to think quite a lot about my political views. I have decided to try and reset my compass and approach the readings assigned to me with an open mind. I have, as of now, no clue where I will end up on the spectrum after I come out on the other side of this. For now, all I want to do is learn as much as I possibly can. And, to judge from the the way the schedule looks and from the level that my class mates are on, it looks more than likely that I will get quite a lot of value for my money.
Thursday, May 10, 2007
My Thesis is Done!
Ok, so I have finally handed in my thesis. It has its weak sides, but over all I am pretty happy with the result. If you are interested in Hurricane Katrina, read it here:
www.willamette.edu/~mramberg
www.willamette.edu/~mramberg
Friday, December 08, 2006
Response Paper 8
Response Paper- Andre Gorz
One of the most pressing issues in the Swedish political debate of now is what to do about long-term unemployment in its different forms. The argument on the Right many times takes the form of a critique of the welfare state and its supposed suppression of the work morality. The welfare system, in this line of argument, offers too easy a solution for individuals not interested in work, who will end up taking advantage of the system. The solution to the problem is, according to these people, less emphasis on social security and more so on economic growth and flexible labor market laws. Thereby jobs would be created and the unemployed taken care of. The problem with the welfare state would then be that it has not efficiently enough enforced a work moral. Hence the Right many times bring up old socialist slogans such as “the right to work” against the socialist project of the welfare state. In this context, it is interesting to consider Grosz’ critique of the “socialist morality”. Although the socialist morality in his argument is mentioned in a slightly different context, one cannot argue other than that the welfare system is built on grounds of a moral obligation to work and contribute. The welfare state therefore, in Grosz’ argument, would be a system perpetuating totalitarian ideals. The link to libertarian ideals in this context is very interesting.
In essence, Grosz’ shares a number of ideals with modern libertarians, but they are divided over a very basic issue; whether or not wage labor can constitute freedom. According to Grosz, there will always be a great number of people who do not find any other function of wage labor than to earn money in order to “live”. One can of course not argue with this fact, but I find it more interesting to focus on another fact: that there are a lot of people who manage to find a job where they actually get a sense of satisfaction. I would also argue that the number of people who find their work stimulating has increased over time, and not the other way round. When we look at Grosz’ second text, about ecology, we get an image of what a step on the way to his utopian society would look like. It becomes evident when reading this part that his argument is not fully consistent. People might just work 20 hours per week, but where and how is his work performed? There must still be an element of repression, since one cannot freely choose where or with what to work. Let’s say that one would not like to work at all, how would society answer to this? Where in the capitalist system a person at least has the theoretical ability to move towards even more satisfying work, in Grosz’ society this ability is not available in the line of socialized work. One must also wonder, wherein lies the need to dedicate time to pottery etc. in times when these are not needed for anything else than decorative purposes? I would argue that the reason to why these things used to have a direct use-value is because they were needed. Is there really a higher inherent value in a cabinet because it has been made, and not bought, by me? It feels like Grosz in this second text provides an argument which seems more colored by an old fashioned, romantic, idea of what “value” really means.
One of the most pressing issues in the Swedish political debate of now is what to do about long-term unemployment in its different forms. The argument on the Right many times takes the form of a critique of the welfare state and its supposed suppression of the work morality. The welfare system, in this line of argument, offers too easy a solution for individuals not interested in work, who will end up taking advantage of the system. The solution to the problem is, according to these people, less emphasis on social security and more so on economic growth and flexible labor market laws. Thereby jobs would be created and the unemployed taken care of. The problem with the welfare state would then be that it has not efficiently enough enforced a work moral. Hence the Right many times bring up old socialist slogans such as “the right to work” against the socialist project of the welfare state. In this context, it is interesting to consider Grosz’ critique of the “socialist morality”. Although the socialist morality in his argument is mentioned in a slightly different context, one cannot argue other than that the welfare system is built on grounds of a moral obligation to work and contribute. The welfare state therefore, in Grosz’ argument, would be a system perpetuating totalitarian ideals. The link to libertarian ideals in this context is very interesting.
In essence, Grosz’ shares a number of ideals with modern libertarians, but they are divided over a very basic issue; whether or not wage labor can constitute freedom. According to Grosz, there will always be a great number of people who do not find any other function of wage labor than to earn money in order to “live”. One can of course not argue with this fact, but I find it more interesting to focus on another fact: that there are a lot of people who manage to find a job where they actually get a sense of satisfaction. I would also argue that the number of people who find their work stimulating has increased over time, and not the other way round. When we look at Grosz’ second text, about ecology, we get an image of what a step on the way to his utopian society would look like. It becomes evident when reading this part that his argument is not fully consistent. People might just work 20 hours per week, but where and how is his work performed? There must still be an element of repression, since one cannot freely choose where or with what to work. Let’s say that one would not like to work at all, how would society answer to this? Where in the capitalist system a person at least has the theoretical ability to move towards even more satisfying work, in Grosz’ society this ability is not available in the line of socialized work. One must also wonder, wherein lies the need to dedicate time to pottery etc. in times when these are not needed for anything else than decorative purposes? I would argue that the reason to why these things used to have a direct use-value is because they were needed. Is there really a higher inherent value in a cabinet because it has been made, and not bought, by me? It feels like Grosz in this second text provides an argument which seems more colored by an old fashioned, romantic, idea of what “value” really means.
Response Paper 7
Response Paper
What is wrong with Russia? Reading the chapter on the revolutions of 1989 in Eley made me think of the fact that Russia has been significantly behind in the economic and social development that has dramatically transformed large parts of central and eastern Europe. Although, as Eley points out, Russia under Jeltsin went through much of the same “shock treatment” as the rest of the countries in the eastern bloc, it did not manage to develop at the same rate as the other counties once the dust settled.
Though I might largely be speculating I can think of a number of possible reasons. Eley argues that the EU governments had no interest in democracy per se for eastern Europe, but were just looking for access to the new markets. I think this is a rather bold statement, and I do not think it holds up in the longer time frame. As the central and eastern European countries started to show interest in joining the European community they were forced indirectly to reform in order to take part in negotiations. Hence the European Union played an important part as outside proponent of democratization. Because of the sheer size of the Russian republic and its traditional role in the European political life, it has never been thought of as a truly potential member of the European Union. Hence the same pressure has not been applied by the European states.
The difference in political culture is often pointed out as being fundamental to the failure of Russian democracy. A number of the central European states that have gone through a rapid democratic evolvement have at least during a short time of their history been a constitutional democracy of some sort. The lack of a democratic tradition in Russia can be assumed to be of importance.
The fact that Russia for the most part of the last ten years or so has been involved in a bloody conflict in Chechnya has certainly not helped the democratic efforts. During a war an administration is a lot more likely to be lax with questions concerning human rights etc. With a significant part of the administrative power gathered directly under the executive as in Russia, the possibilities for corruption are next to endless. All in all, these conditions are not exactly conducive to democratic and economic development.
What is wrong with Russia? Reading the chapter on the revolutions of 1989 in Eley made me think of the fact that Russia has been significantly behind in the economic and social development that has dramatically transformed large parts of central and eastern Europe. Although, as Eley points out, Russia under Jeltsin went through much of the same “shock treatment” as the rest of the countries in the eastern bloc, it did not manage to develop at the same rate as the other counties once the dust settled.
Though I might largely be speculating I can think of a number of possible reasons. Eley argues that the EU governments had no interest in democracy per se for eastern Europe, but were just looking for access to the new markets. I think this is a rather bold statement, and I do not think it holds up in the longer time frame. As the central and eastern European countries started to show interest in joining the European community they were forced indirectly to reform in order to take part in negotiations. Hence the European Union played an important part as outside proponent of democratization. Because of the sheer size of the Russian republic and its traditional role in the European political life, it has never been thought of as a truly potential member of the European Union. Hence the same pressure has not been applied by the European states.
The difference in political culture is often pointed out as being fundamental to the failure of Russian democracy. A number of the central European states that have gone through a rapid democratic evolvement have at least during a short time of their history been a constitutional democracy of some sort. The lack of a democratic tradition in Russia can be assumed to be of importance.
The fact that Russia for the most part of the last ten years or so has been involved in a bloody conflict in Chechnya has certainly not helped the democratic efforts. During a war an administration is a lot more likely to be lax with questions concerning human rights etc. With a significant part of the administrative power gathered directly under the executive as in Russia, the possibilities for corruption are next to endless. All in all, these conditions are not exactly conducive to democratic and economic development.
Response Paper 6
Response Paper- Gramsci
What made me once turn away from socialism was that I found it to be, contrary to what its proponents would say, an elitist movement. The most engaged “socialists” I would meet as a teenager were often from an upper-middle class background. These were the people that my friend Henrik, electrician and union activist, would refer to as the “red-wine left”. We knew very well that as soon as these people would come out on the labor market and start owning higher wages, they would slowly move away from their adolescent dreams and start voting for the liberal party or the conservatives. They would still think back on those days with a warm feeling, probably greatly overestimating their level of involvement or impact. Henrik and I shared that feeling. For him it would turn into bitterness, but also increased radicalization and engagement in the workers movement. After much deliberation, I chose a path more natural for a university student of political science, one in which I felt that I could argument with the intellectual left without being reactionary. That path was libertarianism.
The reading of Gramsci’s Marxism and Modern Culture brought these thoughts back to my mind. In my understanding, this exact conflict is what is at the heart of Gramsci’s arguments. While lead and discussed by intellectuals from the middle classes, Marxism is not a workers movement, hardly even a movement for the workers. Without an intellectualization of the working classes on their own terms, Marxism is doomed to be an elitist movement.
What many view as radical politics today (fair trade, sustainability etc.) rely on middle-class action for the working class. As long as this is the case, the class rifts will remain deep, with the workers held at a safe distance in order to receive the crumbs. I am not sure what Gramsci’s solution to this problem entails. My solution is the democratization of information and international trade that we are currently experiencing. A solution brought on by profit interests, combined with the audacity and ingenuity of individuals all over the world.
What made me once turn away from socialism was that I found it to be, contrary to what its proponents would say, an elitist movement. The most engaged “socialists” I would meet as a teenager were often from an upper-middle class background. These were the people that my friend Henrik, electrician and union activist, would refer to as the “red-wine left”. We knew very well that as soon as these people would come out on the labor market and start owning higher wages, they would slowly move away from their adolescent dreams and start voting for the liberal party or the conservatives. They would still think back on those days with a warm feeling, probably greatly overestimating their level of involvement or impact. Henrik and I shared that feeling. For him it would turn into bitterness, but also increased radicalization and engagement in the workers movement. After much deliberation, I chose a path more natural for a university student of political science, one in which I felt that I could argument with the intellectual left without being reactionary. That path was libertarianism.
The reading of Gramsci’s Marxism and Modern Culture brought these thoughts back to my mind. In my understanding, this exact conflict is what is at the heart of Gramsci’s arguments. While lead and discussed by intellectuals from the middle classes, Marxism is not a workers movement, hardly even a movement for the workers. Without an intellectualization of the working classes on their own terms, Marxism is doomed to be an elitist movement.
What many view as radical politics today (fair trade, sustainability etc.) rely on middle-class action for the working class. As long as this is the case, the class rifts will remain deep, with the workers held at a safe distance in order to receive the crumbs. I am not sure what Gramsci’s solution to this problem entails. My solution is the democratization of information and international trade that we are currently experiencing. A solution brought on by profit interests, combined with the audacity and ingenuity of individuals all over the world.
Sunday, November 19, 2006
Response Paper 5
I found Serings piece on fascism to be highly interesting. The definitions and expressions used in his piece are worthy of a closer investigation, if one wants to ground his work in the current time. Although he does not define the exact meaning of planned capitalism, it is fairly clear that what he is aiming at is corporatism. A system- which he points out- that can be the tool for both imperialism or progressive planning for welfare. At least the initial states of fascism would thus rest on the same model as the welfare state as it has come to be developed in a lot of European countries, only with the exception that labor has been left out of the game. Fascism is, furthermore, a “product of decomposition”, a result of the democratic crisis in times of economic hardship.
I think proponents of both socialism and classic liberalism can find Serings piece as speaking for their solutions. The liberals would hold out the corruptibility of the political system and the moulding of political and economic spheres as the weak point, whereas socialists would look to the cycles of crises in the capitalist system. The liberals could argue that the crises have had the severe effect that they have been seen to have had because of the close interconnectedness of state and economy. His distinctions between planned and unplanned capitalism and planned and unplanned imperialism, leaves the field open for arguments following the similar line. It is therefore a forceful argument against capitalism in the real world, without getting stuck in the theoretical jargon that he knows is hard to argue with. That the solution, to Sering, lies outside of the system and not in it becomes clear though, as he points out that there are indeed two worlds, and that the wanderer between these two worlds has nothing to offer. Therefore we have reason to believe that Sering is a proponent of a solution far more radical than that of the social democrats.
I think proponents of both socialism and classic liberalism can find Serings piece as speaking for their solutions. The liberals would hold out the corruptibility of the political system and the moulding of political and economic spheres as the weak point, whereas socialists would look to the cycles of crises in the capitalist system. The liberals could argue that the crises have had the severe effect that they have been seen to have had because of the close interconnectedness of state and economy. His distinctions between planned and unplanned capitalism and planned and unplanned imperialism, leaves the field open for arguments following the similar line. It is therefore a forceful argument against capitalism in the real world, without getting stuck in the theoretical jargon that he knows is hard to argue with. That the solution, to Sering, lies outside of the system and not in it becomes clear though, as he points out that there are indeed two worlds, and that the wanderer between these two worlds has nothing to offer. Therefore we have reason to believe that Sering is a proponent of a solution far more radical than that of the social democrats.
ABOUT THE MOVEMENT
During this, my third semester at Willamette University, I have learned more about USA than I could ever have hoped for. I have started to discover the country behind the statistics and the school book examples through its most important element: its people. This discovery is still only at the very basic level, and I do not hold any illusions that I will ever gain a full understanding. The Willamette University campus is an extremely small and skewed representation of this country. Through the education and personal interactions I have been personally blessed with here through my work as well as through my other social interactions though, I have come to learn a great deal about this country, my home country and most importantly about myself.
Yesterday I was amazed by the response from the university administration to the demands brought forward by the Concerned Students for Social Justice. I have never before seen an action taken by a number of students have such instant and profound effect. I feel honored to be a part of something that I hope will profoundly change not only this, but other campuses. I will do my best to bring word about what is going on at our campus to everyone I know, wherever they may be, so that they might feel inspired to address these issues with fervor and inspiration.
It is important to notice though, that at this point, all the goals of this movement have not been reached. There is still a great deal of work to be done. We can all find a role in this work, if we engage ourselves in any way, may it be through discussions with fellow students, participation in activities and events, or critical self-assessment.
Integral to this work is to have a sense of humility, respect and a will to learn and listen. Together with passion and a readiness for conflict, this makes for smart activism. I do not share all the sentiments expressed by the individuals in this movement. I will not automatically endorse just any activity, without considering the impact. This movement consists of individuals, and therefore there will be conflicts. It would be also be foolish to believe that the inequalities that are prevalent in the greater society will not show themselves in the internal work of this movement.
I want to talk to you; my friends, colleagues, fellow students. I want you to challenge my view, I want you to question me. Call me out on my inconsistencies. I am not a morally high-standing individual that wants to lecture you about what you ought to believe. I want change and I want action to further this change.
Yesterday, president Pelton wrote:
"Recent events have tested the measure of who we are and what we stand for as a commonwealth of learning. We now have the opportunity to consider with deliberation and thoughtfulness how we can do better."
Last week mattered. Now let’s go on with this.
Yesterday I was amazed by the response from the university administration to the demands brought forward by the Concerned Students for Social Justice. I have never before seen an action taken by a number of students have such instant and profound effect. I feel honored to be a part of something that I hope will profoundly change not only this, but other campuses. I will do my best to bring word about what is going on at our campus to everyone I know, wherever they may be, so that they might feel inspired to address these issues with fervor and inspiration.
It is important to notice though, that at this point, all the goals of this movement have not been reached. There is still a great deal of work to be done. We can all find a role in this work, if we engage ourselves in any way, may it be through discussions with fellow students, participation in activities and events, or critical self-assessment.
Integral to this work is to have a sense of humility, respect and a will to learn and listen. Together with passion and a readiness for conflict, this makes for smart activism. I do not share all the sentiments expressed by the individuals in this movement. I will not automatically endorse just any activity, without considering the impact. This movement consists of individuals, and therefore there will be conflicts. It would be also be foolish to believe that the inequalities that are prevalent in the greater society will not show themselves in the internal work of this movement.
I want to talk to you; my friends, colleagues, fellow students. I want you to challenge my view, I want you to question me. Call me out on my inconsistencies. I am not a morally high-standing individual that wants to lecture you about what you ought to believe. I want change and I want action to further this change.
Yesterday, president Pelton wrote:
"Recent events have tested the measure of who we are and what we stand for as a commonwealth of learning. We now have the opportunity to consider with deliberation and thoughtfulness how we can do better."
Last week mattered. Now let’s go on with this.
Saturday, November 11, 2006
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